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ABSTRACT 
Fusion Centers are in a unique position to provide the necessary collaborative space to 
bring the federal intelligence community together with state, local and tribal initiatives to 
support homeland security efforts at the grass roots level. Fusion Centers are described as 
a collaborative effort of two or more agencies to share, or more importantly, fuse 
information or data from multiple sources. Although, fusion centers have developed at 
different intervals, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has provided guiding 
documents to support fusion center maturation. This research examines these documents 
and proposed strategies incorporated into four proficient fusion centers in the Northeast 
Region of the United States to identify best or smart practices, success stories and areas 
for improvement. 
There has been a plethora of literature written concerning fusion centers since the 
tragedies of September 11, 2001. These categories of the literature include: official 
documents, guidelines and lessons learned for intelligence input, civil liberties safeguards 
and protections and literature dealing with the intelligence cycle and information sharing. 
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Give me six hours to chop down a tree and I will spend the first four 
sharpening the axe 
Abraham Lincoln 
Proficiency and perfection are critical components in today’s fusion center 
environment. Tasked with the ability to share information and create collaboration 
between federal, state, local and tribal partners while managing an all crimes and all 
hazards perspective, in addition to preventing terrorism, will require a finely honed 
instrument. 
The value proposition for fusion centers is that by integrating various streams of 
information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal, state, local, and 
tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to 
people, economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated into 
protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent manmade (terrorist) attacks 
and to respond to natural disasters and manmade threats quickly and efficiently should 
they occur. As recipients of federal government-provided national intelligence, another 
goal of fusion centers is to model how events inimical to U.S. interests overseas may be 
manifested in their communities, and align protective resources accordingly. There are 
several risks to the fusion center concept, including potential privacy and civil liberties 
violations, and the possible inability of fusion centers to demonstrate utility in the 
absence of future terrorist attacks (Rollins, 2007, p.1) 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, it became clearly evident that an attack 
on U.S. soil was not only possible; it was also highly probable. In addition: 
In the spring of 2002, law enforcement executives and intelligence experts 
attending the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit recognized that local, state, tribal, 




them must work towards common goals, gathering information and 
producing intelligence within their agency and sharing that intelligence 
with other law enforcement and public safety agencies. 
(National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, 2003, p. 1)  
The development of fusion centers provides significant evidence of America’s 
willingness to address current and future threats and enhance information exchange by 
“Building Communities of Trust” (BCOT) based on common safety and security 
concerns and in doing so protect the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals by 
upholding the Constitution of the United States as our core foundation based on sound 
principles and values. “The Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) initiative focuses on 
developing relationships of trust between law enforcement, fusion centers, and the 
communities they serve, particularly immigrant and minority communities, so that the 
challenges of crime control and prevention of terrorism can be addressed” (Wasserman, 
2010, p. 3) 
On March 11, 2009, United States Department of Homeland Security Secretary 
Napolitano related in her remarks to the National Fusion Center conference in Kansas 
City, Missouri,“ I believe that fusion centers will be the centerpiece of state, local, federal 
intelligence-sharing for the future and that the Department of Homeland Security will be 
working and aiming its programs to underlie fusion centers.” (Napolitano, 2009) 
Fusion centers serve not only as physical space for multi-agency collaboration 
and information sharing; they also present an opportunity for change to increase 
protection through prevention; however, formal adoption of this strategic initiative may 
require a unified acceptance across the Intelligence Community. “In their January 2005 
survey, the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices revealed that states 
ranked the development of state fusion centers as one of their highest priorities.” (Fusion 
Center Guidelines, p. 1)  
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A. ARGUMENT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FUSION 
CENTER 
Fusion centers have been described as a grass roots effort to identify threats at the 
state and local levels of government in an effort to support the federal intelligence 
community in preventing crime and terrorism. These efforts have become more inclusive 
to also address natural disasters in an all hazards approach. The integration of 
multidiscipline agencies such as fire, public health, and emergency management, as well 
as the private sector, has opened lines of communications and increased collaboration in 
an effort to indentify the preincident indicators of terrorism and include such programs as 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR’s).  
Fusion Centers are identified by the United States Department of Justice as an 
effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize 
resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by 
merging data from a variety of sources. Fusion Centers are intended to support 
information exchange at the federal, state and local levels of government and to enhance 
the overall security of the Homeland. State and local/regional fusion centers gather 
information in their area of responsibility (AOR) and attempt to create syntheses of 
information combined with federal intelligence to see the big picture or to conduct 
predictive analysis to prevent another terrorist attack. Fusion Centers have be defined as a 
mechanism to detect and prevent all threat, all crime and all hazard incidents; however, 
there is no requirement that these centers contain all of these capabilities, and each center 
differs based on their individual responsibilities as well as direction provided by state and 
local governments. In addition, fusion centers add increased value to the overall 
intelligence community.  
This introductory section describes the fusion center value proposition and 
provides a greater understanding of the necessity of fusion centers; identifies primary and 
regional fusion centers, defines the intelligence cycle and intelligence systems to share 
information, as well as reporting current success stories of fusion center operations. This 
section is presented to gain a greater understanding of fusion center concepts.  
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1. The Fusion Center Value Proposition 
Fusion Centers add value to the intelligence community faced with both 
international and domestic threats.  
 Conceptually, the argument that fusion centers represent a vital part of our 
nation’s homeland security relies on at least four presumptions: 
Intelligence, and the intelligence process, plays a vital role in preventing 
terrorist attacks. 
 It is essential to fuse a broader range of data, including nontraditional 
source data, to create a more comprehensive threat picture. State, local, 
and tribal law enforcement and public sector agencies are in a unique 
position to make observations and collect information that may be central 
to the type of threat assessment referenced above. 
 Having fusion activities take place at the subfederal level can benefit state 
and local communities and possibly have national benefits as well. 
2. DHS’s Value Proposition 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stated that the value of fusion 
centers to both DHS and state and local authorities include a number of common and 
distinct functions. The following four areas were assessed by DHS as being common 
benefits fusion centers and would yield to DHS and state and local authorities: 
 Clearly defined information-gathering requirements. 
 Improved intelligence analysis and production capabilities. 
 Improved information/intelligence sharing and dissemination. 
 Improved prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities.  
DHS also outlined areas of how it and state and local authorities would benefit 
uniquely from participation in the fusion centers. Unique benefits to DHS include: 
 Improved information flow from state and local entities to DHS. 
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 Improved situational awareness. 
 Improved access to local officials. 
 Consultation on state and local issues. 
 Access to nontraditional information sources. 
According to DHS, the unique benefit of fusion centers to state and local 
authorities includes: 
 Improved information flow from DHS to states and localities. 
 Increased on-site intelligence and DHS law enforcement expertise and 
capabilities. 
 Clearly defined DHS entry point. 
 Insight into federal priorities. 
 Participation in dialogue concerning threats” (Rollins, 2007 p. 3). 
To increase interconnectivity, as well as ensuring information sharing capability 
across the Fusion Center Network, the U.S Department of Homeland Security has 
supported the establishment of a myriad of state and Regional Fusion Centers across the 
United States. These centers described below are designated as primary and recognized 
fusion centers. 
3. Primary and Recognized Fusion Centers 
There are currently 72 fusion centers throughout the country, 50 State Centers and 
22 Regional Centers. Fusion Centers are owned and operated by state and local 
governments. The primary designation refers to the state centers designated by the state’s 
Governor, while recognize centers refer to regional centers.  
Primary fusion centers serve as the focal points within the state and local 
environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-
related information and have additional responsibilities related to the 
coordination of critical operational capabilities across the statewide fusion 
process with other recognized fusion centers or major urban area fusion 
centers.  
(U.S Department of Homeland Security, 2011 p. 1) 
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Figure 1.   National Integrated Network of Fusion Centers (From Porter, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2011, p. 42) 
72 designated fusion centers 
50 Primary states Centers 
22 Major Urban Areas Centers 
Fusion Centers are tasked with gathering information from a multitude of sources; 
however, this information adds little value without a systematic process or approach. 
Connecting the dots can only be achieved, by first identifying the dots. Below is a review 
of the systems currently being utilized to support federal, state and local information 
sharing, which includes the intelligence cycle.  
4. Importance of Intelligence and Intelligence Sharing 
“Failure to connect the dots” were the words used to describe the events that led 
to the attacks on September11, 2011. However, the question remains, could we have 
made a difference if we had seen the big picture? Today’s world is becoming smaller, 
with the speed of travel and the use of the Internet for rapid communications; a distant 
enemy separated by time and geography is no longer the case. The lines between 
domestic and international activities are becoming blurred. Terrorists, as well as 
criminals, seek benefits through transnational operations looking for the path of least 
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resistance. Decentralized networks of criminal and terrorist organizations are becoming 
the norm as groups, such as Al-Qaeda, spread across the Middle East and Africa. 
Terrorist activities can occur anywhere and at anytime. It is said it takes a network to 
defeat a network. “Decentralized organizations can be so resilient that it’s hard to affect 
their internal structure. The best opponent for a starfish organization is often another 
starfish.” (Brafman, 2006, p. 155)  Fusion Centers utilizing a decentralize structure are 
perfectly positioned to collect, analyzes and disseminate real time information to support 
federal, state, local and tribal governments in their terrorism and crime prevention efforts.  
 
Figure 2.   The Intelligence Process (From U.S. Department of Homeland Security and 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 19) 
The importance of intelligence sharing is furthered emphasized in a CRS report to 
Congress titled Fusion Centers Issues and Options for Congress.  
To briefly expand upon the four presumptions, which are often cited in 
arguments, that fusion centers are valuable to homeland security, it is important to first 
focus on the role of intelligence in homeland security, especially with regard to 
prevention efforts. At the First Annual National Fusion Center Conference, Secretary 
Chertoff reiterated to the hundreds of state and local conference participants that he views 
intelligence as an early warning system that allows public safety officials to get a jump 
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on the adversary. The 9/11 Commission states, “Not only does good intelligence win 
wars, but the best intelligence enables us to prevent them from happening altogether.” All 
major post-9/11 government reorganizations, legislation, and programs have emphasized 
the importance of intelligence in preventing, mitigating, and responding to future terrorist 
attacks. This includes the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, specifically 
the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the passage of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2005 P.L. 108–458), intelligence 
sharing provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107–56), as well as the creation of 
the Intelligence Sharing Environment (ISE), among numerous other developments. 
Another presumption that is often cited is that to prevent attacks intelligence needs to 
include a broad range of data, including that from nontraditional sources—state and local 
homeland security-related personnel and the private sector. The Commission found that 
the September 11 attack plots: fell into the void between foreign and domestic threats. 
The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to U.S. 
interests there. The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat 
from sleeper cells within the United States. As such, the 9/11 Commission concluded 
there was a necessity for fusing domestic and foreign intelligence. Fusing foreign 
intelligence with a wide spectrum of domestic information is the stated primary purpose 
of most fusion centers. Locally gathered information collected from a broad array of law 
enforcement, public health and safety, as well as private sector sources, is fused with 
intelligence collected and produced by the security resources” (Rollins, 2007, p. 5).   
Intelligence collection and intelligence sharing continues to be a key component 
echoed in the 2010 National Security Strategy.  
Intelligence: Our country’s safety and prosperity depend on the quality of 
the intelligence we collect and the analysis we produce, our ability to 
evaluate and share this information in a timely manner, and our ability to 
counter intelligence threats. This is as true for the strategic intelligence 
that informs executive decisions as it is for intelligence support to 
homeland security, state, local, and tribal governments, our troops, and 
critical national missions. We are working to better integrate the 
Intelligence Community, while also enhancing the capabilities of our 
Intelligence Community members. We are strengthening our partnerships 
with foreign intelligence services and sustaining strong ties with our close 
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allies and we continue to invest in the men and women of the Intelligence 
Community.  
(National Security Strategy, 2010, p. 15)  
5. Intelligence Systems to Share Information 
There are many systems at the federal level of government available to share 
information across the fusion center network. These systems are primarily utilized to 
share information at both the classified and unclassified levels. Although, fusion centers 
utilize internal information sharing systems, networks and systems to which state and 
local fusion centers have access at the federal level provide a mechanism to engage the 
intelligence community. 
Table 1.   Federal Intelligence Sharing Systems 
Networks and 
Systems to Which 
state and local 
Fusion Centers 
May Have Access 
System or 
network  Owner  
Sensitivity 
level 
Brief summary of selected 
functions  





Network (HSIN)  
DHS  Sensitive but 
unclassified  
• _Supports secure 
communications and 
collaboration across the law 
enforcement community.  
 
• _DHS’ primary 
system for sharing 
terrorism and related 
information.  





analyses of terrorist 







DHS  Sensitive but 
unclassified  
• _Secret-level classified 
communications network system 
with which government agencies 
are able to share information and 
collaborate in order to detect, 
deter, and mitigate threats to the 
homeland at the Secret level.  
• _Provides state and local 
governments with their own area 
to post and manage collateral-
level information for access by 
• _Manages 
information to help 
ensure the safety and 
security of federal 
buildings, protection 




Systems to Which 
state and local 
Fusion Centers 
May Have Access 
System or 
network  Owner  
Sensitivity 
level 
Brief summary of selected 
functions  
Types of information 
shared  
their federal law enforcement and 





DHS  Secret  • _Serves as a global area 
network used for communicating 
Secret information.  
• _Operated, maintained, and 








inspections that are 
classified at the Secret 
level.  
 









• _Supports an Internet-
accessible focal point for 
electronic sensitive but 
unclassified communication and 
information sharing with federal, 
state, local, and tribal law 





investigative case files 
and intelligence 




Online (LEO)  
DOJ  Sensitive but 
unclassified  
 • _Contains 
information about, 




criminal justice.  
 
 
 (From GAO-08-35, Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges 
Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, 2007, p. 13 
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Table 2.   Federal Intelligence Sharing Systems, Cont’d 
System or network Owner 
Sensitivity level Brief 
summary of selected 
functions Types of 





Brief summary of 





Sharing Systems Automated 
Trusted Information 
Exchange (RISS ATIX)  
State and local 
officials of the 
RISS program 
with funding 



















have public safety 
responsibilities.  
• _Partitioned into 
39 communities of 





public health, and 
government 
officials. Services 
offered through its 
Web pages are 















related to terrorism 
and homeland 






 (GAO-08-35, Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges 
Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, 2007, p. 14) 
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In developing a model fusion center, it is also important to establish a barometer 
for success and to gain an understanding of what constitutes a successful fusion center. 
Described below are examples of successful fusion center initiatives.  
6. The Success of Fusion Centers 
There have been several incidents where fusion centers across the country have 
supported various crime and terrorism prevention initiatives. These efforts, although 
sometimes remaining unnoticed, have contributed to the overall safety and security of our 
communities and our country.  
Every day, state and major urban area fusion centers receive, analyze, 
disseminate, and gather homeland security information in order to protect our local 
communities. Fusion centers enable DHS and other federal partners to connect with state, 
local and tribal law enforcement and homeland security partners to collaborate on 
terrorism, crime and other homeland security issues. For instance, at the end of June, the 
Colorado Information and Analysis Center (CIAC) played an instrumental role in the 
arrest of an individual suspected of placing two bombs at a local bookstore. In June 2011, 
the Lakewood Police Department was notified about an incident at a bookstore at a 
Colorado mall. Due to the nature of the crime, the Lakewood Police Department notified 
the FBI of the incident who then activated the local joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). 
The JTTF is led by the FBI and comprised of local, state and federal law enforcement 
agencies. After the JTTF collected preliminary information, it was sent to the fusion 
center and distributed nationwide and to Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO) requesting 
information that might relate to the incident.  Later that same day, the suspect crashed his 
vehicle on a highway in Clear Creek County, CO. A Colorado state Trooper, who is also 
a TLO, investigated the crash and took the suspect into custody on charges related to 
menacing and driving under the influence of alcohol. Less than 24 hours later, the 
Colorado fusion center released additional information about a possible suspect in the 
bookstore incident, including information about the suspect’s vehicle. When the trooper 
received this information he suspected that the driver he had arrested was the suspect in 
the bookstore mall bombing. He contacted the fusion center to provide this information, 
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which in turn, notified the JTTF. The suspect was later charged with crimes related to 
threatening public safety related to the placing of the bombs in the bookstore. This event 
shows the important role of information sharing and fusion centers in our nation’s 
homeland security effort. Hometown security is essential to homeland security. DHS 
support of fusion centers, like the one in Colorado, empowers local officials to better 
protect their communities and the nation from evolving security threats.  
In addition, fusion centers continue to serve as hubs for information sharing to 
defeat potential terrorist related incidents. “On August 4, 2007, the Department of 
Homeland Security deployed IO assigned to the Florida Fusion Center (FFC) received a 
call from the Florida Homeland Security Adviser (HSA) regarding an on-going traffic 
stop of two University of South Florida students in Goose Creek, South Carolina. The 
HSA did not have specifics other than it involved a bomb squad and a Florida registered 
vehicle. The Department of Homeland Security National Operation’s Center (NOC) had 
no visibility of the traffic stop but began to query North Carolina and South Carolina. The 
Department deployed Intelligence Officers (IO) and received further information 
regarding the incident from an FFC representative with specific information he received 
from a colleague at Operation SeaHawk in South Carolina. The FFC was able to provide 
the tag number of the vehicle and conducted full database checks on the vehicle’s history 
and owner information. All of the results were provided to the NOC, South Carolina, and 
Tampa-JTTF within minutes for their situational awareness. The FFC was able to provide 
full database checks on the subjects to South Carolina and Tampa-JTTFs. An indictment 
was unsealed August 31, 2007, against the two students, Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif 
Mohamed and Youssef Samir Megahed, both Egyptian nationals, charging them with 
transporting explosives in interstate commerce without permits. Mohamed was also 
charged with distributing information about building and using an explosive device. 
Mohamed pled guilty to providing material support to terrorists on June 18, 2008, and 
was sentenced to 15 years in prison December 18, 2008. Megahed was acquitted of 
explosives charges in April 2009. Immigration and Customs Enforcement later took 
custody of him and launched removal proceedings against him. An immigration judge 
declined to find Megahed removable and granted his Motion to Terminate on October 9, 
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2009. The department decided not to appeal the judge’s order. If it were not for the fusion 
centers and an Operation SeaHawk representative, Florida and the Department would not 
have gained situational awareness regarding the incident. Florida was able to provide 
relevant information regarding the subjects and associates to South Carolina law 
enforcement officials and the JTTF within minutes to aid in their investigation”(U.S. 
department of Homeland Security, 2011, p. 1).  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Fusion Centers are identified by the United States Department of Justice as an 
effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize 
resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by 
merging data from a variety of sources. Fusion Centers are intended to support 
information exchange at the federal, state and local levels of government and to enhance 
the overall security of the Homeland. State and local/regional fusion centers gather 
information in their area of responsibility (AOR) and attempt to create syntheses of 
information combined with federal intelligence to see the big picture or to conduct 
predictive analysis to prevent another terrorist attack. Today, there are currently 72 fusion 
centers throughout the county comprised of 50 state and 22 local or regional centers. 
These centers created in 2004 and 2005 were initially developed with few guidelines or 
formalized structures, which limited their ability to effectively communicate or share 
information with other federal, state and local partners.  This lack of interoperability 
resulted in information “silos,” as centers intended to share information were inefficient 
in meeting their intended purpose. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S 
Department of Justice, Justice, 2005, p. 1). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative's (Global) has since produced many strategic documents to serve as templates 
or guidelines to support the structured development of fusion centers as well as to address 
all threats, all crime and all hazard issues.  
It is uncertain, at this time, if these strategies are effective or require change in an 
effort to develop a model fusion center. Fusion centers developed without guidance or 
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formalize structure may become fractionalized limiting their ability to serve their 
intended customers or stakeholders, as well as the overall fusion center network.  
In addition, Fusion Center Directors in conjunction with the federal government 
have identified “Four Critical Operational Capabilities” (COCs) necessary for successful 
fusion center operations (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S Department of 
Justice, 2010, p. 5). These capabilities, including the ability to receive classified and 
unclassified information across various networks or systems, the ability to assess local 
implications of threat information, the ability to further disseminate threat information 
with state, local and private sector partners, and the ability to gather locally-generated 
information, aggregate, analyze and share this information with federal partners will 
require fusion centers to develop short-term gap mitigation strategies. Furthermore, 
fusion centers will be required to gather information lawfully to ensure the protection of 
privacy, civil rights and civil liberties of individuals, which may be overlooked as 
information is gathered and exchanged between fusion centers. (Privacy, Civil Rights, 
and Civil Liberties Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise, 2010, p. 1).  
In summary, the current mix of fusion center models results in a wide variance in 
levels of capabilities, and they are not all well prepared to deal with classified materials 
both in terms of access and in terms of dissemination to others or with privacy/civil rights 
issues. The establishment of a National Homeland Security Fusion Center Doctrine may 
be necessary to support standardization among the plethora of fusion centers throughout 
the country. The adage: ‘if you seen one fusion center you’ve seen one fusion center’ 
constitutes a sense of inferiority or lack of uniformity that may or may not be an accurate 
depiction of overall fusion center’s efficiency and effectiveness.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What will a model of an optimal fusion center, one that addresses the critical 
operational capabilities, as well as protecting Civil Liberties and Civil Rights of the 
general public during Suspicious Activity Reporting, need to look like? 
Is a National Homeland Security Fusion Center Doctrine necessary to ensure 
efficiency and effectiveness across the Fusion Center Network? 
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What are the necessary core components for fusion centers to ensure success and 
how will fusion centers achieve operational relevance? 
Are there standard performance measures to support Fusion Center Operations? 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
There has been a plethora of literature written concerning fusion centers since the 
tragedies of September 11, 2001. These categories of the literature include: official 
documents, guidelines and lesson-learned for intelligence input, civil liberties safeguards 
and protections and literature dealing with the intelligence cycle and information sharing. 
This thesis will attempt to identify the correlation between the implementation of the 
current United States Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice 
suggested Fusion Center Guidelines, and the employment of these guidelines in the 
successful development of a model fusion center, including the identification of best or 
smart practices, lessons learned and future requirements or gaps requiring additional 
exploration.  
Future research efforts will include observations and analysis of four fusion 
center’s daily operations, as well as a review of fusion center documents and operating 
procedures. The information acquired during this process will serve the immediate 
consumers, Fusion Center Directors, as well as the public and private sector organizations 
identified as fusion center product recipients. In addition, this thesis will serve as a 
barometer to support Homeland Security practitioners and leaders nationally by 
identifying future strategies to enhance fusion center development. 
In addition to identifying the key components that constitutes a model fusion 
center, this research also provides an opportunity for the author to gather information for 
a future practical application of lessons learned. The information acquired during this 
thesis will be utilize to support the development of a future fusion center located in the 
Delaware Valley region, whose mission will be to support four state fusion centers 
located in the states of New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland from a 
regional area of operations. Below is a description of the proposed fusion center located 
in the Delaware Valley region. 
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1. Proposed Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC)  
On behalf of the Delaware Valley Emergency Management and Homeland 
Security Coordination Council (DVEM&HSCC), the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Terrorism Task Force (SEPA RTF), the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and 
Preparedness (NJ OHSP), the Philadelphia Area Regional Transit Security Work Group 
(PARTSWG), and the Philadelphia Police Department have proposed to consolidate 
regional planning efforts and develop a multi-county, four-state, regional intelligence 
fusion center. 
The Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC) will be an information and 
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination facility whose mission will be to 
support and enhance public safety in the twelve-county, four-state Delaware Valley 
Region, including Southeastern Pennsylvania, Southern New Jersey, Northern Delaware, 
and Northeast Maryland. The Center will support and enhance the activities of the 
numerous investigative and operational bodies currently functioning in these states by 
enabling them to be more effective and focused in their public safety missions. In 
addition, the DVRWG has engaged in partnerships with the U.S. Coast Guard's Area 
Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) for the Ports of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
Camden, New Jersey, and Wilmington, Delaware.  
a. Goals 
The goals of the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center are to support 
Homeland Security and crime prevention efforts in the Delaware Valley Region. The 
Center will: 
 Engage in an all-source, all-crimes, all-hazards approach to information 
sharing in ground, maritime, aviation, and cyberspace environments;  
 Collect, analyze, disseminate real-time intelligence information to the 
appropriate operational and executive elements; 
 Enhance regional coordination and assist in deconfliction efforts; 
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 Provide the basis for intelligence–led policing and homeland security 
functionality; and 
 Facilitate public/private sector information sharing and coordination. 
b. Objectives 
The objectives of the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center are to: 
 Allow local and state public and private agencies, as well as the federal sector, 
to better forecast and identify emerging crime and hazard trends; 
 Support multi-disciplinary, risk-based problem-solving approaches to 
proactively address terrorism, crime, and hazard threats; 
 Support a community-focused public safety strategy; 
 Provide a continuous flow of intelligence and information to assist public 
safety field operations; and 
 Enhance the delivery of emergency and nonemergency services to the public. 
c. Proposed Outcomes 
The proposed Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC) will provide 
the mechanism for regional information sharing, collection, analysis, and dissemination 
to strategically and tactically support preparedness and response. federal, state, and local 
public agencies, as well as private businesses have given their support for the fusion 
center. Core staff of the SEPA RTF has developed a DVIC Charter that provides 
governance for fusion center operations and administration. A Managing Board, an 
Executive Advisory Committee and several work groups have been created and SEPA 
RTF representatives have initiated searches for a facility, training resources, and other 
assets required for fusion center implementation.  
To date, commitments from state-run fusion centers in Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland have been acquired; Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) 
have been researched to address legal issues among the multi-state county partners. 
Significant multi-agency organizations, such as the Area Maritime Security Committee  
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(AMSC) for the U.S. Coast Guard, Sector Delaware Bay, and the Philadelphia Area 
Regional Transit Security Work Group (PARTSWG) have agreed to partner in planning 
and funding acquisitions.  
The City of Philadelphia has determined that colocating certain city 
operational functions in the same facility as the DVIC will result in economies of scale 
and potential advantages in operational coordination. The current concept is to locate the 
Homeland Security and Criminal Intelligence components of the Philadelphia Police 
Department within the DVIC envelope. As a separate, but contiguous entity, the present 
intent is to locate the City’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at the same facility. 
The current design concept is that there will be common spaces for meetings; conferences 
and training that will be shared by the DVIC and the EOC. 
Since funding to begin implementation of the DVIC already exists, the 
current project plan would be to move forward with the DVIC first, and then expand the 
project to include the EOC as funding sources are identified. After incorporation of EOC 
implementation into the project, the city may add other related functions that would 
benefit from being in proximity to the DVIC and EOC.  
In an effort to build a model fusion center , this research examines best or 
smart practices and key components within four state fusion centers, guiding documents 
for Fusion Center development, the role of leadership, collaboration, protection of civil 
liberties and civil rights, fusion center critical operating capabilities success stories, as 
well as the path forward for future fusion centers.   
E. HYPOTHESES OR TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Developing a model fusion center to enhance information sharing will require the 
implementation of standards, or the development of a National Homeland Security 
Fusion Center Doctrine established across the fusion center network to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency. These standards include: 1) the development of a mission 
statement to establish fusion center goals and objectives, 2) ensuring adherence with the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, 3) creating a governance structure that is 
representative of law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector to enhance 
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information sharing among all stakeholders at the federal, state, local and private sector 
levels. 4) Instituting the establishment of appropriate security for facilities, data and 
personnel through the utilization of existing and emerging technologies, 5) providing 
training to enhance and ensure fusion center leadership and privacy/civil rights 
protections, while adopting a philosophy of intelligence-led policing to connect the dots 
to increase crime and terrorism prevention, 6) build collaborative relationships across all 
disciplines to address all threat, all crime and all hazards, 7) explore database 
interoperability to streamline operations and provide the best overall operational picture, 
and 8) institute Suspicious Activity Reporting to identify prewarning indicators  of 
potential terrorist related activity. It is the assumption of this research that although early 
fusion centers have developed without formal guidance; the implementation of standard 
practices and procedures will augment the performance of fusion centers, protect 
individual privacy, and streamline operations to enhance terrorism and crime prevention. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been numerous documents written concerning fusion centers, which 
identify their importance and their potential pitfalls. The categories of the literature 
include: official documents, guidelines and lesson-learned for intelligence input, civil 
liberties safeguards and literature dealing with the intelligence cycle and information 
sharing. 
A. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO FUSION CENTERS  
The first category of literature reviewed looks at official documents that discuss 
the role of fusion centers including, documents written by federal, state and local 
government committees, government sponsored organizations, including congressional 
service research reports, as well as guidelines for successful fusion center development. 
These documents, including such publications as the Council on Foreign Relations, CRS 
Report on fusion centers describe the value of fusion centers as a mechanism of sharing 
information to prevent terrorism. The CRS report provides a general understanding of the 
fusion center concept, the potential drawback of fusion centers, including immaturity 
issues and the dangers of potential privacy violations, as well as the suggested path 
forward in fusion center development. The report is general in nature but provides 
recommendations, including the creation of a national fusion center network to enhance 
information exchange (Masse, T., O’Neil, S., & Rollin, J, CRS Report: Fusion Center 
2007, p. 1).  
The CRS report falls short in identifying the means by which to achieve these 
suggested goals and the measures necessary to minimize the risk to the general public as 
collection of information may negatively impact civil liberties. The CRS report stresses:  
The value proposition for fusion centers is that by integrating various 
streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the 
federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the 
private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic 
infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated into  
 
 22
protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent manmade 
(terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural disasters and manmade threats 
quickly and efficiently should they occur.  
(Masse, T., O’Neil, S., & Rollin, J, CRS Report: Fusion Center 2007, p. 1)  
The testimony of former Director Robert Riegle, state and Local Program Office, Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis regarding the Future of Fusion Centers and Potential 
Promise and Danger is a dissertation of the testimony provided by former Director Riegle 
before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment.  
This testimony provides the described vision of fusion centers, their necessity and 
the federal support that will be required for sustainment. The format is easy to follow as it 
flows from the vision to the necessary components required for future fusion center 
development. The testimony provided by Mr. Riegle is concise and covers such areas as 
incorporating diverse multiple disciplines as fusion center partners and provides a 
template for the future (Riegle, R. 2009 The Future of Fusion Center and Potential 
Promise and Danger, 2010, p. 1). 
Fusion centers (Kaplan, E. 2007, CRS report: Fusion Centers) provides an 
overview of how fusion centers work, the federal support necessary in pushing 
information to state and local partners, the value of intelligence-led policing, addressing 
the all hazard approach, avoiding information overload and protecting civil liberties of 
individuals who are not suspected of a crime in violation of the Federal Privacy Act of 
1974. Kaplan further relates “Experts say putting this information at the fingertips of 
local law enforcement—who are likelier than federal authorities to come across aspiring 
terrorists on U.S. soil—transforms police officers from first responders into “first 
preventers.” (Kaplan, E. 2007, CRS report: Fusion Centers)  
The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General’s report 
:DHS’ Role in state and local fusion centers is evolving” depicts the importance of 
information sharing since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the establishment 
of fusion centers, creating fusion center guidance and information sharing requirements, 
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developing a strategy for information sharing within fusion centers, and DHS’ role to 
support fusion center coordination and timely information dissemination. This document 
further emphasizes the importance of the federal government’s willingness to partner 
with state and local fusion centers and provides guidance and support through the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis. 
These documents, consisting of Congressional Service Reports, statements of 
former Director Robert Riegle, state and Local Program Office, Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis and the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General report, “ 
DHS’ Role in state and local fusion centers provide a brief overview of the importance of 
fusion centers and their contribution to terrorism prevention. All authors concur that the 
importance of fusion centers lies in their ability to share information across a broad 
spectrum of stakeholders. The CRS report and the testimony of former Director Riegle 
argue that fusion centers are an area for consideration to enhance information sharing. 
Each document identifies the roles fusion centers play in support of the federal 
government in terrorism prevention. In addition, each document warns of the necessity of 
ensuring the protection of civil liberties of the general public.  
These reports provided a well-rounded overview of the importance of fusion 
centers, their development and a description of the roles fusion centers play at the state 
and local levels to support the overall intelligence community. The information was 
comprehensive and inspired further research in this area. 
B. LITERATURE ON GUIDELINES AND LESSONS-LEARNED FOR 
INTELLIGENCE INPUT 
The second category of literature reviewed provides guidelines and lessons-
learned for intelligence input, tasking and dissemination, and information-sharing to stay 
at the forefront of the fusion center phenomenon. Documents, such as the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOJ’s 
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, provide best practices or smart practices for 
the development of a model fusion center to enhance information sharing.  
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The Fusion Center Guidelines, “Developing and Sharing Information in a New 
Era” provide guidelines for the establishment of fusion centers at the local, state and 
federal levels. It serves as a roadmap for successful fusion center development and 
implementation. The Fusion Center Guidelines is insightful in its methodology while 
remaining specific to the structuring of fusion centers. Recognizing that in 2004 and 2005 
many fusion centers were developed with little or no guidance, the Fusion Center 
Guidelines provide a clear depiction of the fusion process, the role of leadership, fusion 
center concepts and functions, information flow, and a phased approach integrating law 
enforcement, public safety and the private sector into a cohesive collaborative 
environment. It further identifies the necessary requirements and collaborations needed to 
meet the fusion center’s missions and goals and ensure consistency across the country. 
(Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines 2006, p. 3).  
The Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities for state and major urban area fusion 
centers is a supplemental document to the Fusion Center Guidelines and further identifies 
the baseline level of capability and standards necessary for fusion centers to perform 
basic functions. It identifies structures, processes and tools to support the fusion center 
function of gathering, processing, analysis and dissemination of information. The Fusion 
Center Baseline Capabilities document provides guidance to ensure fusion centers are 
established and operated consistently across the country. The Baseline Capabilities 
document is divided into two sections, Fusion Process Capabilities and Management and 
Administrative Capabilities. 
In addition, the critical operational capabilities for state and major urban area 
fusion centers, Short-Term Gap Mitigation Strategy Guidebook takes a look at where 
fusion centers currently are in development. Staying with the idea of standardization, this 
document identifies current gaps in fusion center development and provides templates to 
meet fusion center critical operational capabilities. All three documents reviewed appear 
to reveal a need for consistency or standardized structure among fusion centers, or the 
creation of a model fusion center. 
The literature on fusion center guidelines was comprehensive and provided a 
roadmap for fusion center development based on standard or best practices to formalize 
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fusion centers across the fusion center network. Furthermore, a review of testimony 
provided by Michael C. Mines, Deputy Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation before the House Committee on Homeland Security 
describes the criticality of fusion centers from an FBI perspective, and the commitment of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to stem the threat of terrorism through collaborative 
efforts at the federal, state, local and tribal levels of government. This testimony provides 
valuable insight into the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s increasing 
partnerships with fusion centers throughout the country and the strengthening of the FBI 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the primary investigative agency tasked with terrorism 
investigation and prevention through information sharing. “Currently, the FBI 
participates in 36 fusion centers, which is realized through our 56 field intelligence 
groups (FIGs) that serve as the primary link between the FBI and the fusion center 
network. To date, a total of 256 FIG personnel are assigned to the 36 fusion centers 
throughout the United States. Of these, 68 are special agents, 123 are intelligence 
analysts, and 65 are personnel assigned to other work roles (e.g., language analysts, 
financial analysts, and investigative support specialists” (Mines, 2007, p.1).  
C. LITERATURE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES SAFEGUARDS 
The third category of literature reviewed examines civil liberties safeguards, 
including First Amendment protections, as well as review of civilian committees, such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) focused on privacy, civil rights and civil 
liberties protections that bring a watchful eye to fusion center development.  
The establishment of privacy and civil rights protection within fusion center 
development is critical to the mission and future sustainment of fusion centers. A 
document written by the ACLU entitled “What‘s Wrong with Fusion Centers” depicts the 
concern for the collection of information by fusion centers in an era when technology, 
government powers, and a zest for the war on terrorism is predominant among the fusion 
center culture.  
The document warns of intrusion of the privacy of the general public. It questions 
and argues the need for fusion centers and emphasizes that information collected about 
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the American public must be collected lawfully and with utmost care. Specifically, the 
ACLU emphasizes the need for oversight, as it relates to collaboration between fusion 
centers, the private sector and the military as these partnerships offer data-mining 
opportunities that are not traditional law enforcement sources of information. The ACLU 
document provides oversight and has a ground truth effect in ensuring that the protection 
of individual privacy is considered with each law enforcement encounter and transaction. 
The literature also serves as a warning for fusion centers that violate the law and stresses 
the need for fusion center transparency through independent oversight to remove the 
perception of excessive secrecy in fusion center operations. 
D. LITERATURE ON THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AND INFORMATION 
SHARING ENVIRONMENT 
The fourth category of literature reviewed focuses on the intelligence cycle and 
the information-sharing environment, including the types of systems and mechanisms 
used by fusion centers to support everyday operations.  
Fusion centers appear to be in an excellent position to support law enforcement 
intelligence missions in post- 9/11 eras as strategies, such as Intelligence Led Policing 
come to the forefront of modern day policing efforts (David L Carter, 2004, p. 1). A 
review of the United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis describes fusion centers as;  
The logical touch-points for the Department to access local information 
and expertise as well as provide them with timely, relevant information 
and intelligence derived from all-source analysis. The result is a new 
intelligence discipline and tradecraft that gives us a new, more complete 
understanding of the threat. The Department provides personnel and tools 
to the fusion centers to enable the National Fusion Center Network.  
(Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2010, p. 2)  
Both documents identify strategies for fusion centers to reach their goals of crime and 
terrorism prevention. The documents described above provided a step-by-step 
methodology for the institution of intelligence led policing, describing crime-fighting and 
terrorism prevention strategies. The information was succinct and complete as Carter  
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argues that new crime fighting strategies, such as intelligence-led policing will enhance 
fusion center efficiency and effectiveness in enabling the centers to better identify and 
forecast criminal behavior.  
A review of intelligence sharing systems, currently being utilized by state and 
local fusion centers, included a 2009 press release written by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security titled “DHS Announces New Information-Sharing 
Tool to Help Fusion Centers Combat Terrorism.”  In 2009, the United States Department 
of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Defense, announced a 
major initiative to allow fusion centers to share classified terrorism-related information 
residing in DoD’s classified network known as the Secret Internet Protocol Router 
(SIPRNET) (Department of Homeland Security SIPERNET, 2009). This document, 
written as a press release, provides a quick overview of this initiative while identifying a 
vehicle by which DHS can disseminate information to the widespread fusion center 
community in a timely manner. The document was written to inspire collaboration and 
commitment of federal resources to support state and local terrorism prevention 
strategies. In addition, this document argues that information contained in classified DoD 
databases can, without much heavy lifting, be used by state and local agencies in an effort 
to fight terrorism.  
In addition, a review of the “Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious 
Activity Report (SAR)” (U.S. Department of Justice 2008, p. 2) list six major findings, 
including the importance of leading from the top, ensuring privacy protections through 
formalized privacy policies, utilizing the intelligence cycle to process SAR data, 
standardized formatting for information sharing, the necessity for providing education to 
law enforcement tasked with collecting SAR data, and the education of the community 
regarding the SAR’s process, as well as the use of technology to develop information 
networks.  
The recognized need to advance the sharing of terrorism-related law 
enforcement information was clearly articulated in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and in several national-level 
documents, such as the National Strategy for Information Sharing (NSIS), 
issued to reinforce, prioritize, and unify our nation’s efforts to advance the 
 28
sharing of terrorism-related information among federal, state, and local 
government entities; the private sector; and foreign partners. The primary 
purpose of this initiative is to identify those behaviors that are reasonably 
indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal 
activity and coordinate the sharing of information with the appropriate 
fusion center and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces.  
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2010, p. 1) 
E. SUPPLEMENTARY LITERATURE 
Supplementary literature reviewed, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
e-guardian system, allows information sharing between fusion centers and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and appears to be as an excellent collaboration tool (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, e-guardian system, 2008 p. 1). This document provides an 
overview of the FBI intelligence collection and dissemination system and was written as 
an informational bulletin to inspire state and local fusion centers to share information 
with the FBI. This document, written as an instructive tool, did not focus on the necessity 
of the integration of other intelligence collection systems such as the Homeland Security 
Information Sharing Network (HSIN). This DHS information sharing strategy is designed 
as secure web-based portal to share information across what DHS describes as the 
community of interest (United States Department of Homeland Security’s Information 
Network, 2008).  
A further literature review of additional intelligence collection systems, such as 
LEO, Law Enforcement Online (Federal Bureau of Investigation, law enforcement 
online, 1995 p. 1), the United States Department of Homeland Security Shared Space 
currently being utilized to support the National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SARS 
Reporting, 2009), and RISS (Regional Information Sharing System, 2007), all describe 
information collection and sharing strategies from various intelligence agency view 
points; however, none of these documents, LEO, SARS, or RISS  specifically address 
how or if these systems were collaborative, and if there was any endeavor underway to 
coordinate these systems into a common portal of information sharing.  
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The above documents were written as guidelines for imputing information into 
various intelligence databases. The information presented in these documents was 
instructional in nature and argued the importance of information sharing across federal, 
state and local agencies.  
A review of the 9/11 Commission Report supports this argument “A breakdown 
in information sharing was a major factor contributing to the failure to prevent the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, according to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States” (9/11 Commission Report, 2002).  This document argues that the 
information was present to prevent a terrorist attack, but the identified failure to share 
information was evident and the results of this information sharing failure are obvious. 
The 9/11 Commission Report is a detailed document that depicts the tragedies of 
September 11, 2001, and the miss steps that led to the attack.  
The 9/11 Commission Report provides an insider’s view of the historical events. 
A review of documents, such as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act, 2004), requires 
that the President prescribe and implement procedures under which federal agencies can 
share relevant and appropriate homeland security information with other federal agencies 
and with appropriate state and local personnel, such as law enforcement agencies and first 
responders (GAO-08-35 Homeland Security Report, 2007, p. 1). These documents, 
written as Acts, provide a statuary plan passed by congress to support information 
sharing. These documents also provide guidance and direction at the federal level to 
extend support to the state and local fusion centers. Written as federal documents, they 
argue for the need of the establishment of the United States Department of Homeland 
Security and the need for the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of 
intelligence information.  
Additionally, literature reviewed, such as “DHS wants Fire Service to Join Fusion 
Centers” (DHS wants Fire Service to Join Fusion Centers, 2010, p. 1), has identified a 
new fusion center development with the integration of Fire Services into fusion centers. 
The document argues that the incorporation of additional emergency services into fusion 
centers will foster better relationships and increase prevention through comprehensive 
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multi-discipline reporting. The document serves as an instructional article and provides 
guidance on Fire Service integration to support multidiscipline information sharing.  
A review of the Federal Emergency Management Comprehensive Guide indicates 
in order for a fusion center to be comprehensive, they must also be focused on all hazards 
(FEMA, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 502, 2009, p. 1). This document 
describes the need for fusion center expansion to mitigate all threats. It provides guidance 
on ensuring public safety through all hazard mitigation. This document argues or 
suggests the necessity of adding one more step in the fusion center evolution covering 
new areas of responsibility.  
Although, the above mentioned literature provides an overview of where fusion 
center are in development, it is important to provide a more general understanding of 
fusion centers.  At this time, literature suggests that there is no formalized model that 
indicates how fusion centers should be structured. Authors have stated that the value 
added to the development of fusion centers is the comingling of various intelligence 
sources at the federal, state, and local levels of government, including the private sector 
to better-forecast possible harm as a result of terrorist, criminal and all hazards events. 
This assumption in the literature reviewed appears to be the core of fusion center 
acceptance (T. Massee, S. O’Neil, & J. Rollins, Fusion Center: Issues and Options for 
Congress, 2007, p. 1).  
The above literature reviewed regarding the information sharing environment, 
provided the researcher with an mosaic image of various opinions, options and concerns 
regarding current fusion center development, including expanding missions, current silos 
of information, and possible repeated mistakes that could once again leave us vulnerable 
to another attack, without some sort of resolution based on structure and coordinated 
information sharing across all agencies. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a review of this preliminary literature provided a wealth of 
information, which was rich in identifying a broad spectrum of opinions and suggestions, 
while opening up possibilities for discovering further alternative solutions and options. 
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The literature was comprehensive and established a framework for future research and 
exploration. Gaps identified in the literature were failures or weaknesses to address 
individual fusion-center performance measures, or how fusion centers are evaluated, what 
constitutes a model fusion center, as the literature appears to be more suggestive and 
fewer directives in nature. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. PROGRAM EVALUATION METHOD 
1. Problem 
In order to enhance multidiscipline information sharing at the federal, state and 
local levels of government, the United States Department of Homeland Security has 
identified state and local/regional fusion centers as primary points of collection, analysis, 
and distribution of real-time threat information over the Fusion Center Network. There 
are currently 72 fusion centers throughout the United States operating at different levels 
of capability. These centers, created in 2004 and 2005, were initially developed with little 
guidelines or formalized structure. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. 
Department of Justice have since produced many documents to serve as templates or 
guidelines to support fusion centers and to develop a cohesive fusion center network. It is 
uncertain at this time if these strategies are effective or require change in an effort to 
develop a model fusion center to enhance information sharing. 
In order to determine whether this intervention or standardization has the intended 
result, the Program Evaluation Method will be utilized. This methodology is being 
utilized because the phenomenon under study is not well-researched, observing actual 
behavior and conducting comprehensive reviews of literature, existing fusion center 
documents and guidelines can allow for a more effective study of the issue at hand in a 
deeper and fuller manner. 
A formative evaluation will be conducted based on-site observations and a review 
of fusion center documents in four fusion centers located in the Northeastern United 
States. Formative evaluations take place in the natural context. Document reviews and 
observations in the field are the primary methods of collecting data. Little is done to 
initiate “control” over the program by design or by statistical manipulation. The case is 
bounded by the evaluator in terms of time, space, people, and context. Formative 
evaluations begin with the collection of data, although bias is always a problem in any 
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form of evaluation, formative evaluators are as neutral as possible before the outset of the 
evaluation. Conceptual data collection and data analytic methodologies emerge as the 
study progresses. A balanced portfolio of program strengths and weaknesses and 
suggestions for improvement are the usual deliverables in a formative evaluation. The 
purpose is to improve the program by identifying strengths and weaknesses of existing 
fusion centers, identify the importance or lack of importance of standardization, identify 
means of effective information sharing and collaboration to enhance the fusion center 
network and to identify or create synthesis in discovering the required steps or actions to 
build a model fusion center.  
B. BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS  
The boundaries of this qualitative analysis will focus on the collection of 
information based on-site observations and review of fusion center documents including, 
missions statements, standard operating procedures, best or smart practices, privacy 
policies, utilization of fusion center guidance documents, as well as other available 
documentation in four fusion centers located in the states of New Jersey, Delaware, 
Pennsylvania and Maryland. These four centers were chosen due to their geographical 
locations, size, and to gather a four state perspective on fusion center processes and 
procedures. They were also chosen to determine if the process of standardization through 
the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security’s Fusion Center Guidelines 
is supporting daily fusion center operations, as well as strengthening the fusion center 
network.  
In addition, the information acquired during this process will be utilize by the 
author’s home agency, the Philadelphia Police Department, to support the development 
of a future fusion center located in the Delaware Valley Region, whose mission will be to 
support the above mentioned four state fusion centers from a regional area of operations. 
C. ON-SITE OBSERVATIONS AND QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
Sampling strategies during fusion center site visits include on-site observations, 
and document review. The purpose for utilizing the types of data collected will include, 
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identifying the strengths and weakness of fusion center standardization, including the 
means of effective information sharing and collaboration to enhance the fusion center 
network. Identify or create synthesis in discovering the required steps or actions to build 
a model fusion center, as well as exploring the importance of leadership, relationship 
building and training to enhance effectiveness, while reducing liabilities. It is intended 
that the information captured during this evaluation will assist in the development of 
series of themes directed to identify the positive and negative assumptions of fusion 
center standardization, collaborative capacity, leadership, training, as well as a reduction 
in liability. An example argument for standardization may include confirmatory themes, 
such as standardization reduces confusion while improving operation consistency.  
In addition, to support this analysis, the employment of a Force Field Analysis 
will be utilized to identify strengths and weaknesses, or the pros and cons of fusion center 
operations, as well as identifying the driving forces that are positive for change and the 
restraining forces that create obstacles for change within current fusion center operations 
and future fusion center development. By employing the Program Evaluation Method, it 
is possible to identify and capture real-world nuisances during on-site observations that 
would not have been possible utilizing alternative research methods such as a survey 
methodology. Based on the above-mentioned process and the identification of concurring 
themes, a detailed analysis will be produced to either support or refute assumptions 
regarding the requirement to develop a formalized fusion center doctrine, as well as 
identifying the necessary components required to build a model fusion center that will 
operate both efficiently and effectively in the prevention and management of all crime, all 
threat and all hazard information.  
D. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Although, the research methodology employed in this thesis examines the current 
guidelines necessary for fusion center development, its scope is limited based on the 
evaluation of four chosen fusion centers and does not evaluate or take into account the 
operational capabilities of the remaining fusion centers, although also extremely capable 
they were not considered in this thesis.  
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In order to gain a better understanding of overall fusion center operations, this 
research begins by examining current fusion center guidance or core principles described 
as the Fusion Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities. These documents serve as 
fusion center doctrine and provide the necessary components or foundation to build a 








IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUSION PROCESS, HOW IS IT 
WORKING?  
Chapter IV examines several core principles of fusion center development, 
including guiding documents such as ”Fusion Center Guidelines” and “Baseline 
Capabilities.” In addition, this chapter further explores the protection of civil rights and 
civil liberties critical to fusion center operations, including the establishment and benefits 
of a formalized privacy policy to support the collection process during suspicious activity 
reporting. The chapter concludes by providing an overview of the fusion center critical 
operational capabilities, the intelligence-led policing model used to connect the dots, and 
the components necessary to achieve an award winning fusion center, as well as 
analyzing the capabilities four fusion centers in the Northeastern United States in 
comparison with the identified Fusion Center Guidelines. 
A. REVIEW OF FEDERAL GUIDANCE 
1. Fusion Center Guidelines 
The Fusion Center Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information in a New Era 
provides guidelines for the establishment of fusion centers at the federal, state, local and 
tribal levels of government (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2006 p 1). This document serves as a roadmap for successful fusion center 
development and implementation. Although, fusion centers have developed at various 
stages throughout the years, Fusion Center Guidelines propose guidance to support 
concurrent development, although these guidelines are not statutory in nature, they prove 




Figure 3.   Fusion Process 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice, as 
well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation along with the Global Information Sharing 
Initiative, have partnered to support fusion development.  
DHS and DOJ have collaborated to provide guidance and technical 
assistance to fusion centers, and along with the PM-ISE, have sponsored 
regional and national conferences, in part to determine the needs of fusion 
centers. For example, DHS and DOJ jointly issued their most recent 
Fusion Center Guidelines in August 2006 that outlines 18 recommended 
elements for establishing and operating fusion centers. The guidelines 
were intended as a way to ensure state and local fusion centers could be 
established and operated consistently and were developed to help fusion 
center administrators create policies, manage resources, and evaluate 
fusion center services.  
(GAO-08-35, 2007, p 36) 
Divided into 18 critical components, the Fusion Center Guidelines begin with a 
clear concise definition or description of fusion centers, and then expand into the core 
competencies or recommendations to support Fusion development. Among other areas 
for consideration, these guidelines include adhering to the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan, developing a clear and concise mission statement, establishing a 
representative governance structure, utilizing Memorandums of Understanding, creating a 
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collaborative environment, leveraging existing systems, as well as developing privacy 
and civil liberties policies and protections. Although the Fusion Center Guidelines 
provide a comprehensive list of suggested measures to support fusion center 
development, this thesis focuses on four core principles for evaluation based on their 
criticality to fusion center operations. The four areas listed below appear to be the basic 
building blocks or founding principles for fusion center development and operations, as 
well as ensuring the protection of individual rights and freedoms. 
a. Guideline 2 Develop and Embrace a Mission Statement and 
Identify Goals 
Mission Statements provide direction and establish goals and objectives 
that are based on clear and concise fusion center requirements. 
A mission statement is a written statement of the organization’s purpose, 
such as enhancing public safety, sharing information, or resolving criminal 
investigations. It is important to have a mission statement because it 
focuses efforts and is the foundation of all the decisions that follow..  
(U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, 
p. 23) 
b. Guideline 4 Create a Collaborative Environment for Sharing of 
Intelligence and Information 
Fusion centers provide collaborative space for multiagency integration; 
however, true collaboration begins with the willingness and acceptance of individuals to 
engage in accomplishing a common mission. 
To maximize intelligence sharing, all levels of law enforcement and public 
safety agencies and the private sector must communicate and collaborate. 
The objective is to leverage resources and expertise while improving the 
ability to detect, prevent, and apprehend terrorists and other criminals. 
(U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2006, p 29) 
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c. Guideline 6 Leverage the Databases, Systems, and Networks 
Leveraging existing databases reduces cost and provides immediate 
communication. “Centers may want to evaluate the types of databases that participating 
agencies have available. Gaps should be identified and researched. Leveraging the 
databases and systems available via participating entities will help maximize information 
sharing.” (U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, p. 
33) 
d. Guideline 8 Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy 
“Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy” (U.S. 
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, p.41). 
Fusion centers focused on Terrorism and Crime prevention must ensure 
the protection of individual Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Although, investigating 
terrorism can become clouded, investigations should be based on a criminal predicate and 
not on an individual’s race, religion, or national origin. 
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) stresses the 
need to ensure that constitutional rights, civil liberties, civil rights, and 
privacy are protected throughout the intelligence process. In order to 
balance law enforcement’s ability to share information with the rights of 
citizens, appropriate privacy and civil liberties policies must be in place. 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 65) 
The Fusion Center Guidelines provide an overview of the core 
competencies necessary for fusion center development. These guidelines serve as the 
building blocks, and provide clear direction for building a model fusion center and are 
not intended as federal mandates, nor do they represent any statuary requirements. 
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B. BASELINE CAPABILITIES FOR STATE AND MAJOR URBAN AREA 
FUSION CENTERS   
The Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities for state and major urban area fusion 
centers is a supplemental document to the Fusion Center Guidelines and further identifies 
the baseline level of capability and standards necessary for fusion centers to perform 
basic functions. It identifies structures, processes and tools to support the fusion center 
function of gathering, processing, analysis and dissemination of information. The Fusion 
Center Baseline Capabilities document provides guidance to ensure fusion centers are 
established and operated consistently across the country. The Baseline Capabilities 
document is divided into two sections, Fusion Process Capabilities and Management and 
Administrative Capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Fusion Process Capabilities 
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By achieving this baseline level of capability, a fusion center will have the 
necessary structures, processes, and tools in place to support the gathering, 
processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, 
and law enforcement information. This baseline level of capability will 
support specific operational capabilities, such as Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR); Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications; Risk Assessments; 
and Situational Awareness Reporting. The development of baseline 
operational standards is called for in the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing  (Strategy) and is a key step to reaching one of the Strategy’s 
goals: “Establishing a National Integrated Network of State and Major 
Urban Area Fusion Centers.” Defining these operational standards allows 
federal, state, local, and tribal officials to identify and plan for the 
resources needed—to include financial, technical assistance, and human 
support—to achieve the Strategy’s goal. 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 1) 
 
 
Figure 5.   Management and Administrative Capabilities (From Director Steven Hewitt, 





In addition, the Baseline Capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers 
introduces the importance of ensuring the protection of civil liberties and civil rights of 
individuals, as well as incorporating fusion centers into the Information Sharing 
Environment.  
To support this requirement, the ISE PGC, which is made up of ISE 
Privacy Officials from the federal agencies participating in the ISE, 
formed a working group to examine the privacy issues relative to state, 
local, and tribal entities, including fusion centers, interfacing with the ISE. 
The PGC State/Local/Tribal Working Group (SLT WG) began with the 
existing guidance found in the Fusion Center Guidelines, specifically 
Guideline 8, “Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties 
policy,” and performed a gap analysis to identify where the guidance to 
the fusion centers did not include the requirements of the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines. While some of the concepts and requirements of the ISE 
Privacy Guidelines are referenced in Guideline 8, noteworthy gaps were 
identified, in part because protected information shared in the ISE is given 
enhanced privacy and civil liberties protection under the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines. In order to provide the most comprehensive guidance, the gap 
analysis compares Guideline 8, the ISE Privacy Guidelines, and 28 Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23, since all address privacy concerns 
and are relevant to the fusion centers. 
 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, 
2008, p. 6) 
C. PROTECTING PRIVACY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
“Benjamin Franklin is said to have observed, “Those who would give up 
ESSENTIAL LIBERTY to purchase a little TEMPORARY SAFETY, deserve neither 
LIBERTY nor SAFETY” (U.S. Department Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Privacy 
and Civil Liberties, 2010, p. 1). 
The establishment of privacy and civil rights protections within fusion center 
development is critical to the mission and future sustainment of fusion centers. A 
document written by the ACLU entitled “What‘s Wrong with Fusion Centers” depicts the 
concern for the collection of information by fusion centers in an era when technology, 
government powers and a zest for the war on terrorism is predominant among the fusion 
center culture. In addition, to ensure transparency, fusion centers may be subject to out- 
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side audits or independent oversight. Public trust is an essential element of fusion center 
operations. Fusion centers must avoid what is known as the “One Way Mirror.”  
Even as fusion centers are positioned to learn more and more about the 
American public, authorities are moving to ensure that the public knows 
less and less about fusion centers. In particular, there appears to be an 
effort by the federal government to coerce states into exempting their 
fusion centers from state open government laws. 
(German, 2008, p. 7)   
Protecting privacy and civil liberties, as well as ensuring public trust is paramount 
within fusion center operations. 
In accordance with Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), as amended, the ISE is a conceptual 
framework composed of the policies, procedures, and technologies linking 
the resources (people, systems, databases, and information) of state, local, 
and tribal (SLT) agencies; federal agencies; and the private sector to 
facilitate terrorism-related information sharing, access, and collaboration. 
Consistent with Presidential Guideline 5, the U.S. Attorney General, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI)—in coordination with the Program Manager for the 
ISE (PM-ISE) and the heads of federal departments and agencies that 
possess or use intelligence or other terrorism-related information—
developed privacy guidelines for the ISE, titled Guidelines to Ensure That 
the Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of Americans Are 
Protected in the Development and Use of the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE Privacy Guidelines). The ISE Privacy Guidelines 
describe the means by which federal departments and agencies 
participating in the ISE will protect privacy and civil liberties in the 
development and operation of the ISE.  
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice, 
2010 p. 3)  
Transparency and communication to the public and other stakeholders regarding 
the establishment of privacy policies is paramount to ensure public acceptance of fusion 
centers throughout the country. Fusion Centers must strike a balance between individual 
rights and freedoms while seeking potential clues of pre-indicators of terrorism. These 
clues potentially developed during such activities, such as Suspicious Activity Reporting 
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(SAR), must be collected lawfully recognizing the requirement to protect constitutional 
freedoms. Violation of privacy may occur through the use of Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) when there is no nexus too criminal or terrorism related behavior.  
1. Benefits of a Privacy Policy 
There are many benefits of a well-established privacy policy, which serves as the 
corner stone of public protection. Public trust is fundamental in ensuring public 
acceptance and support of the Fusion Center Network. Public confidence is quickly lost 
during any indication of any unjust violation of individual freedoms. “A strong privacy 
policy is good public policy, because it is responsive to widely held public expectations 
about the collection and use of information about individuals and the fair and open 
operation of a democratic government. A well-developed privacy policy protects the 
center, external agencies that access and share information with the center, and their 
employees from liability under lawsuits and civil rights and civil liberties complaints; 
protects the public and promotes public trust in information sharing. A comprehensive 
policy that is properly enforced will also result in more effective and efficient use of 
public resources” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2010, p. 2) 
D. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING (SAR) 
“Whether a plan for a terrorist attack is homegrown or originates overseas, 
important knowledge that may forewarn of a future attack may be derived from 
information gathered by state, local, and tribal government personnel in the course of 
routine law enforcement and other activities.”(National Strategy for Information Sharing, 
2007, p. 1) 
Fusion centers are tasked with the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
information to support crime and terrorism prevention, although fusion centers receive 
information from various sources including, the public, and the private sector, as well as 
various public safety disciplines, law enforcement plays an essential role in public 
protection.  
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Local law enforcement agencies are critical to efforts to protect our local 
communities from another terrorist attack. Fundamental to local efforts to 
detect and mitigate potential terrorist threats is ensuring that frontline 
personnel are trained to recognize and document behaviors and incidents 
indicative of criminal activity associated with domestic and international 
terrorism. Daily, there are more than 17,000 local law enforcement 
agencies in the United States that document information regarding 
suspicious behavior, including that related to terrorism. The ISE-SAR 
functional standard defines a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) as 
“Official documentation of observed behavior that may be indicative of 
intelligence gathering or preoperational planning related to terrorism, 
criminal, or other illicit intention. 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 5)   
Although, Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) is essential in preventing terrorist 
related activity, all information must be collected lawfully, contain a criminal predicate, 
or other information specifically related to potential terrorist activity. Information 
collected in an unlawful manner undermines the entire fabric of the fusion center 
network. Proper information management can only be achieved through effective 
leadership and continual training. As fusion centers develop, they will be the responsible 
entity for analyzing these SAR reports from 18,000 law enforcement agencies, as well as 
information collected from the public and private sector. 
E. CRITICAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES (COCS) 
As fusion centers mature, other areas for improvement emerge becoming 
necessary components for fusion center growth and sustainment. During the 2010 
National Fusion Center Conference, Fusion Center Directors, in partnership with the 
federal government, distilled the Baseline Capabilities for state and major urban area 
fusion centers into National Network priorities, including four Critical Operational 
Capabilities (COCs). 
 Receive: Ability to receive classified and unclassified information from 
federal partners. 
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 Analyze: Ability to assess local implications of that threat information 
through the use of a formal risk assessment process. 
 Disseminate: Ability to further disseminate that threat information to other 
state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector entities within their 
jurisdiction. 
 Gather: Ability to gather locally-generated information, aggregate it, 
analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate. 
Strengthening the ability of fusion centers to execute the COCs and ensure 
P/CRCL protections is critical to building an integrated National Network of Fusion 
Centers capable of sharing information with the federal government and SLTT partners 
during situations involving time-sensitive and emerging threats (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, National Network of Fusion Center Fact Sheet, 2010, p. 1).  
F. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
Fusion centers throughout the country appear to be moving toward an intelligence 
led-policing model to support crime and terrorism related investigations.  
The IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center defines criminal 
intelligence as “information compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an 
effort to anticipate, prevent or monitor criminal activity.” It may be 
“strategic” (provide general guidance on emerging patterns and trends) or 
“tactical” (focused on a specific criminal event). Information is not the 
same thing as “intelligence.” Rather, intelligence is the combination of 
credible information with quality analysis. Intelligence-led policing 
defines intelligence by stressing that intelligence is “a guide to operations, 
rather than the reverse. 
(International Association of Chiefs of Police: Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing, 2007, p. 12). 
G. AWARD WINNING FUSION CENTERS: WHAT IS REQUIRED? 
As fusion centers mature, they are recognized for outstanding achievements in 
various areas of fusion center operations, such as fostering collaboration, providing 
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leadership, as well as meeting milestones that support the overall fusion center network. 
This recognition serves to motivate fusion center leaders to develop centers of excellence, 
but more importantly to enhance information sharing and cooperation at the federal, state, 
local and tribal levels of government. At the 2010 Nation Fusion Center Conference, 
several fusion centers were recognized for their outstanding achievements. 
Award winners included: 
 Fusion Center of the Year–The Colorado Information and Analysis Center 
(CIAC) was recognized for exemplifying every aspect of a robust and 
mature fusion center. CIAC leadership has been a strong advocate of 
fusion centers, organizing and supporting the national build-out of the 
network. They were specifically recognized for their recent support to the 
Najibullah Zazi terrorism investigation as well as their leadership during 
the 2008 National Democratic Convention. 
 Fusion Center Federal Representative of the Year–FBI agent, Leslie 
Gardner, assigned to the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center 
(JRIC), was nominated for her leadership in developing the JRIC into a 
nationally recognized model of cooperation and collaboration between 
agencies of all sizes and missions. She has been responsible for initiating 
policies, processes, and programs, which exceeded expectations and drove 
standards across the national network of fusion centers. 
 State/Local Fusion Center Representative of the Year–Mike Sena, Deputy 
Director, Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), was 
recognized for his leadership and management of the NCRIC’s growth and 
maturation. Under his leadership, the fusion center has expanded its all-
crimes/all-hazards mission by providing superior customer service and 
expanding its partnerships across all levels of government. 
 In addition, the 12 pilot sites for the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR) Initiative were recognized for their support to the 
country’s homeland security mission. These sites included police 
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departments in Boston, Chicago, Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, 
Miami-Dade and Washington; Arizona Department of Public Safety 
(Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center), Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement, New York State Intelligence Center, Seattle Police 
Department/Washington State Fusion Center, and the Virginia Fusion 
Center. 
The above information provides a sense of what constitutes a successful fusion 
center, although there are many other attributes required for success, it is valuable to 
understand the recognized matrix for success in the development of a model Fusion 
Center. Leadership, as noted above, whether individually or collectively, appears to be a 
driving force in the success of the recognized fusion centers. By understanding and 
recognizing achievements, developing fusion centers can set the bar to ensure motivation, 
a concept that is not written in any guidance and which often goes unrecognized as a 
driving force to reach identified milestones.  
H. FUSION CENTER REVIEW OF ON-SITE OBSERVATIONS AND 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
As part of the Program Evaluation Method and Formative Analysis, as well as to 
gain a deeper understanding of fusion center operations, on-site observations were 
conducted in four fusion centers located in the Northeastern United States. Formative 
evaluations take place in the neutral context. Document reviews and observations in the 
field are the primary methods of collecting data. The purpose for utilizing the types of 
data collected will include, identifying the strengths and weakness of fusion centers in 
correlation with the four identified Fusion Center Guidelines, including establishing clear 
goals and direction through the incorporation of a mission statement, creation of a  
collaborative environment to share information, the ability to leverage existing databases 
for information exchange, and protecting privacy and civil liberties through established 
privacy policies.  
It is intended that the information captured during this evaluation will assist in the 
development of series of themes directed to identify the positive and negative 
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assumptions of fusion center guidelines, and if they are being utilized efficiently and 
effectively in developing a fusion centers. An analysis of data collected and on-site 
observations will then be used to provide recommendations to identify smart or best 
practices in identifying the necessary components to develop a model fusion center.  
In addition, to support this analysis, the employment of a Force Field Analysis 
will be utilized to identify strengths and weaknesses, or the pros and cons of fusion center 
operations, as well as identifying the driving forces that are positive for change and the 
restraining forces that create obstacles for change within current fusion center operations 
and future fusion center development. By employing the Program Evaluation Method, it 
is possible to identify and capture real-world nuisances during on-site observations that 
would not have been possible utilizing alternative research methods such as a survey 
methodology.  
1. The New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) 
The New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) pronounced 
Rock was established in 2006 within the agency of the New Jersey State Police. The 
ROIC is an all crimes, all hazards and all threats fusion center. The New Jersey ROIC 
consists of three main components: 
 Watch Operations Unit 
 Analysis Unit 
 Strategic Outreach Unit 
The ROIC is a 24-hour a day, seven day a week all-crimes, all-hazards, all-
threats, watch command and analysis center. The New Jersey State Police is the 
executive agency of ROIC and administers the general personnel, policy, and 
management functions. The center’s mission is to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
intelligence to participating law enforcement entities; evaluate intelligence for reliability 
and validity; provide intelligence support to tactical and strategic planning; evaluate 
intelligence in the Statewide Intelligence Management System; and disseminate 
terrorism-related activity and information to the FBI, among others.  
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The ROIC is also the home of the State Emergency Operations Center, the State 
Office of Emergency Management, and the State Police Emergency Management Section 
Offices. The ROIC has personnel assigned (including 13 analysts) from the FBI, DHS, 
ATF, ICE, FAMS, and the U.S. Coast Guard, in addition to personnel from the State 
Police, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, and the Department 
of Transportation.  
The ROIC is seeking representation from the departments of Corrections, Parole, 
Health and Senior Services; Environmental Protection; and Military and Veteran Affairs. 
The ROIC is overseen by a Governance Committee, chaired by the director of ROIC, 
which consists of representatives from state and federal entities and law enforcement 
associations who meet quarterly to discuss ROIC policies and other related matters. In 
addition, the ROIC is seeking to develop additional relationships with private sector 
organizations—such as the American Society of Industrial Security, the Princeton Area 
Security Group, the Bankers and Brokers Group, and the All Hazards Consortium—to 
further the mission of the intelligence analysis element of ROIC. The ROIC consists of 
three components: (1) an analysis component, responsible for collecting, analyzing, and 
disseminating intelligence information entered into the Statewide Intelligence 
Management System by local, county, state, and federal law enforcement; (2) the 
operations component, which will control the actions of State Police operational and 
support personnel and serve as a liaison to federal agencies, other state entities, and 
county or municipal agencies on operational matters; and (3) a call center component, 
which will provide the center with situational awareness intelligence about emergency 
situations. DHS and DOJ systems and networks to which the ROIC has access include 
LEO, HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and ACS, as well as SIPRNet.  
The ROIC disseminates officer safety information, bulletins, and any other 
information deemed to be of value to the law enforcement or homeland security 
community. The State Police provide operational support to the law enforcement 




helicopter support, and Marine services (GAO-08-35, Federal Efforts Are Helping to 
Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by state and Local Information Fusion Centers, 
2007, pp. 87–88). 
a. Watch Operations Unit 
The Watch Operations Unit serves as the alert or warning section and 
operates on a 24/7 basis. The Watch Operations Unit “conducts rapid analysis of violent 
crime, terrorist activity, and emergent incidents (both natural and man-made) to provide 
real time situational awareness of both regional and statewide law enforcement activities. 
It organizes, coordinates, and initiates the deployment phase of all New Jersey State 
Police operational assets and utilizes both open and closed intelligence resources to 
provide tactical intelligence for the purpose of investigational support (Regional 
Operations Intelligence Center, 2006, p. 1). 
b. Analysis Unit 
The process of analysis is utilized in turning information into actionable 
intelligence and serves as the cornerstone of all fusion center operations and also supports 
the development of tactical and strategic decisions. Described as part of the fusion 
process, “the concept of fusion has emerged as a fundamental process to facilitate the 
sharing of homeland security-related and crime information and intelligence.” (U.S 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, 2006, p. 2) 
The Analysis Unit–  
Influences the decision making process, guides the allocation of federal, 
state and local resources, and aids in the investigative process through the 
use of supportive threat and crime analysis, examines and evaluates 
homeland security and counter terror threat streams specific to the state of 
New Jersey and surrounding regions, produces risk and threat assessments 
based upon the current threat environment in relation to regional 
infrastructure vulnerabilities, examines and interprets statistical data and 
trends to provide insight into the current criminal environment and 
produces timely intelligence in an effort to enhance  the decision making 
process as it relates to preventing, detecting and suppressing criminal 
activity.  
(Regional Operations Intelligence Center, 2006, p. 2) 
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c. Strategic Outreach Unit 
Effective communication and collaboration across federal, state, local, 
tribal and the private sector are paramount for the efficient and effective operations of 
fusion centers. “To maximize intelligence sharing, all levels of law enforcement and 
public safety agencies and the private sector must communicate and collaborate. The 
objective is to leverage resources and expertise, while improving the ability to detect, 
prevent, and apprehend terrorists and other criminals. Fostering a collaborative 
environment builds trust among participating entities, strengthens partnerships, and 
provides individual, as well as a collective ownership in missions and goals of the center”  
(Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines 2006, p. 29).  
New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center through their 
Strategic Outreach Unit “promotes ongoing dialogue and timely communication between 
members of the law enforcement community and private sector, enhances private sector 
security through the sharing of threat and crime analysis, and increases the statewide 
intelligence network through inclusion of the private sector, thereby promoting enhanced 
threat detection and crime suppression” (Regional Operations Intelligence Center, 2006 
p. 3). In addition to ensure operational efficiency and compliance, the New Jersey 
Regional Operations Center has instituted the Office of Baseline Capabilities. This new 
office ensures overall operational compliance in accordance with U.S. Department of 
Justice Fusion Center requirements, as well as providing oversight to support the 
institution of the Critical Operating Capabilities and formalized privacy policies. 
d. New Jersey Office of Emergency Management 
In addition, the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (NJ OEM) 
is also located within the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center. Tasked 
with all hazard mitigation the NJ Office of Emergency Management supports the New 
Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center operations.  
The NJ OEM is the lead state agency responsible for preparedness, 
mitigation, response, and recovery efforts related to all natural and man-
made disasters within the state of New Jersey, incorporates traditional and 
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modern law enforcement techniques, practices, and procedures into the 
emergency management environment via an all hazards approach designed 
to protect life and preserve property. 
(Regional Operations Intelligence Center, 2006, p. 4) 
e. Mission Statement 
All efforts begin with the identification of the mission; a mission 
statement is the foundation for present and future actions and decisions. A mission 
statement serves as a navigational instrument providing clear and concise direction.  
A mission statement is a written statement of the organization’s purpose, 
such as enhancing public safety, sharing information, or resolving criminal 
investigations. It is important to have a mission statement because it 
focuses efforts and is the foundation of all the decisions that follow. A 
mission statement can also inspire people in the organization and inform 
customers of the benefits and advantages of what the organization offers 
and is the first step in educating entities about the center and its services. 
(Department of Justice Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 23).  
Understanding the mission is critical to fusion center operations; although missions may 
vary to serve individual operational needs, they must be interwoven through the roles of 
the center. 
The mission of the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center 
(NJ ROIC) is to interface with the New Jersey law enforcement 
community, and other law enforcement and homeland security agencies, 
by being a primary point of contact for collection, evaluation, analysis, 
and dissemination of intelligence data and criminal background 
information in a timely and effective manner in order to detect and/or 
prevent criminal or terrorist activity, and to solve crimes. This mission 
shall remain consistent with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan.  
(New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center Privacy Policy, 
2010, p. 1.)  
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Colonel Rick Funetes, New Jersey State Police Superintendent and 
NJOEM Director, related when interviewed by the New Jersey Office of Emergency 
Management that,  
In its short existence, the fusion center has allowed us to better execute 
decisions and plans based on the productive flow of information both 
internally and externally. This flow has allowed us to deploy resources in 
a timelier manner than in the past. As we all know, when protecting lives, 
time is always of the essence. Colonel Funetes describe four areas of 
concern including the need to effectively manage technology, ensure 
analytical growth, the need for the implementation of a call center and the 
necessity to increase catastrophic planning. In conclusion Colonel Funetes 
describe Good people as the cornerstone of the ROIC. 
(Office of Emergency Management, 2008, p. 1) 
f. Privacy Policy   
Developing a Model Fusion Center will require the development and 
implementation of a formal written privacy policy to ensure the protection of individual 
civil rights and civil liberties. Fusion Center Privacy Policies must also remain 
transparent to ensure public trust. It is also important to ensure that all fusion center 
personnel are aware of privacy requirements, as well as ensuring accountability as 
described below in brief overview the privacy policy instituted by the NJ ROIC. 
“The purpose (goal) of the NJ ROIC Privacy Policy is to ensure protection of the 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of individuals and organizations. The goal of 
establishing and maintaining the NJ ROIC is to further the following purposes: 
 Be an active participant in the Information Sharing Environment. 
 Increase public safety and security in the state of New Jersey, the region 
and to contribute to the security of the nation. 
 Mitigate or minimize the threat and risk of injury to all members of the 
public safety and health care communities. 
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 Mitigate or minimize the threat and risk of damage to real or personal 
property. 
 Protect the individual privacy rights, civil rights or other protected 
interests a person or persons may have. 
 Protect the integrity of the criminal investigative, criminal intelligence, 
and justice system processes and information. 
 Foster relationships with persons or groups of people in an effort to 
promote cooperation between law enforcement and the community, which 
it serves. 
 Make the most effective use of public safety resources.” 
g. Policy Applicability and Legal Compliance  
The NJ ROIC personnel, including enlisted personnel, sworn participating 
agency personnel, civilian New Jersey State Police (NJSP) and 
participating agency personnel will comply with the privacy policy of the 
NJ ROIC. This policy shall apply to any information that the NJ ROIC 
collects, receives, maintains, archives, accesses, or discloses among its 
personnel, other government agencies (including Regional Intelligence 
Sharing Systems [RISS] and Information Sharing Environment [ISE] 
agencies), and partner criminal justice and public safety agencies, as well 
as quasi-government entities, private contractors, and the general public. 
The NJ ROIC will provide a printed copy of this policy to all enlisted, 
civilian and partner agency personnel, as well as contractors who provide 
services and will require both a written acknowledgment of receipt of this 
policy and a written agreement to comply with this policy and all the 
provisions contained herein. All New Jersey Regional Operations 
Intelligence Center (NJ ROIC) personnel, sworn participating agency 
personnel, civilian and participating agency personnel who provide 
information technology services to the NJ ROIC, the New Jersey State 
Police or any participating agency, private contractors and other 
authorized partners or users will comply with all applicable state and 
federal laws concerning the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties.  
The NJ ROIC has adopted internal operating policies that are in 
compliance with applicable laws protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties, including applicable state and federal privacy, civil rights, and 
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civil liberty laws. It is the policy of the NJ ROIC to ensure that all 
personnel assigned to the NJ ROIC strictly adhere to any rule, regulation, 
guideline, or mandate, with regard to the use or dissemination of any 
information or intelligence. It is not the intention of the NJ ROIC 
administrators to create rules or regulations that exceed any pre-existing 
rules or regulations, but to expect compliance with those standards already 
in place. As the NJ ROIC is an entity within the New Jersey State Police, a 
Division within the Department of Law and Public Safety, all applicable 
policies of the Department will be adhered to by the NJ ROIC. Violations 
of this privacy policy by employees of the NJSP, enlisted and civilian, 
shall be disciplined in accordance with administrative procedures available 
to the Superintendent of the State Police. Outside agency personnel 
assigned to the NJ ROIC are subject to removal from assignment to the NJ 
ROIC by the Task Force Commander and shall be referred to their host 
agency for appropriate action. Participating agencies and individual users 
are subject to the enforcement procedures and sanctions provided in 
Accountability and Enforcement. 
(New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center Privacy Policy, 
2010, p. 1.)  
h. Governance and Oversight  
Effective governance provides stability within fusion centers and offers a 
sounding board for decision makers.  
Primary responsibility for the operation of the NJ ROIC, its justice 
systems, operations, coordination of personnel; the receiving, seeking 
retention, evaluation information quality, analysis, destruction, sharing or 
disclosure of information; and the enforcement of this policy is assigned to 
the Task Force Commander of the NJ ROIC. The NJ ROIC is guided by a 
center-designated and trained Privacy Officer who liaises with community 
privacy advocacy groups to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties are protected within the provisions of this policy and within the  
center’s information, collection, retention and dissemination processes, 
and procedures. The Operations Officer is designated as the Privacy 
Officer. 
(New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center Privacy Policy, 
2010, p. 3) 
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i. Information 
The proper collection and management of information is critical to the 
sustainability of fusion centers. Information must be collected properly and within the 
confines of the law “The role of the NJ ROIC is linked closely with the Intelligence-Led 
Policing (ILP) initiative undertaken by the New Jersey State Police. Specifically, ILP is a 
collaborative philosophy based on improved intelligence operations to aid in 
understanding the changes in the operating environment to enable law enforcement to 
rapidly adjust to new circumstances. In its most efficient state, ILP requires police 
officers and investigators to become better data collectors and better consumers of 
intelligence related products. 
The NJ ROIC will seek and retain information and/or intelligence that: 
 Is based upon a criminal predicate or threat to public safety; or 
 Is based upon reasonable suspicion that an identifiable individual or 
organization has committed a criminal offense or is involved in or is 
planning criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity that presents a 
threat to any individual, the community, the state of New Jersey, the 
region, or the nation, and the information is relevant to the criminal 
(including terrorist) conduct or activity; or 
 Is relevant to the investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal 
(including terrorist) incidents; the resulting justice system response; the 
enforcement of sanctions, orders or sentences; or the prevention of crime; 
or 
 Is useful in a crime analysis or in the administration of criminal justice and 
public safety; and the source of the information is reliable and verifiable or 
limitations on the quality of the information are identified; and the 
information was collected in a fair and lawful manner, with the knowledge 
and consent of the individual, if appropriate (New Jersey Regional 
Operations Intelligence Center Privacy Policy, 2010, p. 4). 
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j. Tips and Leads and Suspicious Activity Reports 
The utilization of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) by fusion centers 
provides a mechanism for information collection across many disciplines, as well as the 
private sector. The NJ ROIC will also retain and share suspect information that does not 
reach the level of reasonable suspicion such as tips and leads or suspicious activity 
reports (SAR).  
k. Acquiring and Receiving Information 
The Code of Federal Regulations 28, part 23 mandates federal statuary 
requirements for any agency receiving federal funding.  
Information-gathering (acquisition), and access and investigative 
techniques used by the NJ ROIC and information-originating agencies, 
will remain in compliance with and will adhere to applicable laws and 
guidance, including, but not limited to: 28 CFR Part 23 regarding criminal 
intelligence information. The OECD Fair Information Principles (under 
certain circumstances, there may be exceptions to the Fair Information 
Principles, based, for example, on authorities paralleling those provided in 
the federal Privacy Act; state, local, and tribal law; or center policy). 
Criminal intelligence guidelines established under the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). 
Constitutional provisions; New Jersey statutes; Attorney General 
Guidelines; and administrative rules, as well as regulations and policies 
that apply to multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence information data 
bases. Information-gathering and investigative techniques used by the NJ 
ROIC will, and those used by originating agencies should, be the least 
intrusive means necessary in the particular circumstances to gather 
information it is authorized to seek or retain. 
(National Fusion Center Association, 2010, p. 10) 
l. Analysis 
The New Jersey Regional Operations Center is a highly professional 
organization tasked with preventing crimes, terrorism and all hazards within the state of 
New Jersey. At the core of the centers, success is the leadership and dedication of the 
center personnel. A clear decisive mission statement provides direction and guidance and 
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sets the tone for overall fusion center operations. The New Jersey Regional Operations 
Center also provides a collaborative environment incorporating many federal, state and 
local agencies, while continuing to engage the private sector in critical infrastructure and 
key resource protection. Utilizing existing databases, as well as federal systems, such as 
HSIN and Leo, provide the ROIC with the capability to exchange information across a 
broad spectrum of partnerships. However, a multitude of disparate databases may 
impinge upon information sharing as federal agencies compete for fusion center 
information.  In addition, the New Jersey Regional Operations Center has developed an 
extensive privacy policy to support the protection of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
during the performance of its duties.  
Although there are many attributes that could be considered in the 
development of a model fusion center, the New Jersey Regional Operation’s Center 
meets and exceeds the criteria identified in the four Fusion Center Guidelines chosen for 
this analysis. In addition, to ensure operational efficiency and compliance, the New 
Jersey Regional Operations Center has instituted the Office of Baseline Capabilities. This 
new office ensures overall operational compliance in accordance with U.S. Department 
of Justice Fusion Center requirements, as well as providing oversight to support the 
institution of the Critical Operating Capabilities and formalized privacy policies and can 
be considered as a best or smart practice for other fusion centers throughout the country.  
2. The Delaware Information and Analysis Center (DIAC) 
a. Overview 
The Delaware Information and Analysis Center was established in the 
spring of 2005 within the Homeland Security Unit of the Delaware State Police, which 
also consists of the Counterterrorism Threat Squad, and the DPS Maritime Unit. The 
Delaware Information and Analysis Center is an all crimes and all hazard fusion center.  
The Delaware Information and Analysis Center (DIAC), Delaware’s 
Fusion Center, serves as a critical component of Delaware’s Homeland Security, as well 
as Criminal Intelligence, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Statewide Law 
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Enforcement investigative support. The DIAC adheres to an All Crimes and All Hazards 
approach to Homeland Security at the state level. This approach necessitates that DIAC 
provide real-time information and intelligence to those decision makers with a need and 
right to know in the law enforcement sector. The DIAC has numerous full time 
components embedded within that include a six person analytical section, a Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Unit, and a statewide WMD coordinator. The DIAC’s analytic 
section is composed of four full time civilian intelligence analysts and two Delaware 
National Guard analysts, as well as a Department of Homeland Security representative.  
In addition, the Department of Public Health provided a representative 
who works part time at the DIAC. The Critical Infrastructure Unit is composed of two 
sworn troopers and a civilian critical infrastructure planner. These full time members of 
DIAC work in conjunction with each other to identify, prevent, secure and inform 
Delaware’s Law Enforcement, private sector and public leaders of any and all threats to 
the security of Delaware. In addition to the above full time partners, DIAC works daily 
with Delaware’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI, ATF, ICE, the Delaware National 
Guard, United States Coast Guard, Dover Air Force Base, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and 
The Department of Homeland Security to ensure that information is shared and 
exchanged regularly to better protect our state.  
In 2009, DIAC played a critical role in several events in Delaware. The 
DIAC once again served as the intelligence lead in both NASCAR races held at Dover 
Downs providing a comprehensive threat assessment of the event. DIAC also served as 
an intelligence and information hub for President Obama’s Whistle Stop Tour and 
Inauguration events held in Delaware. DIAC also played a key role in the successful 
Returns Day event attended by Vice President Joe Biden in Georgetown in January. 
DIAC analysts also assisted in numerous successful criminal arrests and prosecutions. 
Several were the result of detailed analysis and suspect workups done by the analysts. 
Others were the direct result of DIAC’s Daily Roll Call bulletins that allowed officers to 
identify suspects in numerous unsolved incidents” (Sawyer, 2010, p. 1). 
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b. Mission Statement 
To enhance the quality of life for all Delaware Citizens and visitors by 
providing professional, competent and compassionate law enforcement services 
c. Information Sharing 
The Delaware Intelligence and Analysis Center supports information 
sharing through its informational bulletins. “The DIAC is proactive in reaching out to 
partner agencies and dissemination intelligence in a fast, efficient manner, using a variety 
of products, which include, but are not limited to: 
 Daily Roll- Call Bulletins (BOLOs, Requests for Information, Officer 
Safety) 
 Subject Matter-Specific Bulletins (Daily Infrastructure) 
 Threat Assessments 
 On-Site Analytical Support 
 Long-Term Analytical Products 
 Networks and Databases  
There are several databases being utilized by the Delaware Intelligence 
and Analysis Center:   
 Post-9/11, several online networks and databases have been developed 
which have proved useful for the purpose of sharing intelligence and 
other information between law enforcement agencies. These include, 
but are not limited to: Statewide Intelligence System (Memex 
Patriarch)—a private sector-developed intelligence software product 
that serves as Delaware’s statewide intelligence database, providing a 
searchable database for both intelligence reports and suspicious 
activity reports (SARs);  
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 Law Enforcement Online (LEO)—A website accredited and approved 
by the FBI for sensitive but unclassified information. LEO is intended 
to be used to support investigative operations, send notifications and 
alerts, and provide an avenue for federal, state, and local personnel to 
remotely access other law enforcement and intelligence systems and 
resources;  
 Homeland Security State & Local Intelligence Community of Interest 
(HS-SLIC)—An information sharing website for federal, state, and 
local intelligence agencies and fusion centers;  
 Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS)—a federally funded 
nationwide program consisting of six regional centers and a technical 
support center that provides flexible and locally based services to 
federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and criminal justice 
agencies nationwide, as well as Australia, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and New Zealand. RISS maintains the RISS Secure Intranet 
(RISSNET), which allows for the sharing of information and 
intelligence between members; and  
 Guardian/E-Guardian—A centralized nationwide database for SARs 
 Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx)—A website, 
operated by the FBI under the auspices of the Criminal Justice 
Information Services (CJIS), that brings together data from law 
enforcement agencies nationwide, including incident and case reports, 
booking and incarceration data, and parole/probation information. N-
DEx then detects relationships between people, vehicles/property, 
locations, and/or crime characteristics. The site also assists in 
information sharing between law enforcement agencies, fusion centers, 




involved when links are found following a query on N-DEx. All law 
enforcement personnel and analysts who have attended N-DEx 
training have access to N-DEx.” 
d. The Counter-Terrorism Threat Squad  
The Counter Terrorism Unit focuses Delaware efforts in the mission of 
Homeland Security.  
The squad was established in April of 2002 and continues their homeland 
security efforts, protecting the citizenry and key assets of Delaware. This 
unit works directly with the U.S. Attorney’s “Anti-Terrorism Advisory 
Council” (ATAC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism 
Task Force (JTTF), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the 
United States Secret Service, the United States Coast Guard, the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Postal Inspector, 
the Delaware National Guard, all U.S. military service investigative units, 
other state police agencies, and regional, county/municipal law 
enforcement agencies. The squad is charged with investigating terrorism 
and related activities within the state of Delaware and works with federal 
agents to develop criminal intelligence information and criminal 
prosecutions in this area. This unit also monitors the toll free tip line for 
leads and assigns these leads appropriately to various law enforcement 
jurisdictions. 
(Delaware State Police Intelligence Unit, 2011, p. 1) 
e. DSP Maritime Unit 
As part of the information collection efforts and in an effort to enhance 
Port Security in Sector Delaware Bay, as well as increase security of critical 
infrastructure, the Delaware State Police provide security, intelligence and outreach for 
the state’s critical infrastructure along the waterways. This unit works in conjunction with 
the other maritime units in the area to provide coordinated response to the needs of the 
Maritime Community Delaware Information and Analysis Center Privacy Policy  
The purpose of an established privacy policy is to ensure the protection of 
individual Civil Rights and Civil Liberties under the United States Constitution. 
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Statement of Purpose  
This privacy policy will allow the Delaware Information and Analysis 
Center (DIAC) to establish how protected information is collected, used, and secured in 
order to apply this policy to daily operations. As a result, the privacy policy will clearly 
define the law, policy, and procedure that the DIAC, participating agencies, and 
authorized users need to comply with in order to appropriately protect privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties.  
The goal of establishing and maintaining the DIAC is to further the 
following purposes:  
(a) Increase public safety and improve national security;  
(b) Minimize the threat and risk of injury to specific individuals;  
(c) Minimize the threat and risk of physical or financial injury to law 
enforcement and others responsible for public protection, safety, or 
health;  
(d) Minimize the threat and risk of damage to real or personal 
property;  
(e) Protect individual privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, and other 
protected interests;  
(f) Protect the integrity of the criminal investigatory, criminal 
intelligence, and justice system processes and information;  
(g) Minimize reluctance of individuals or groups to use or cooperate 
with the justice system;  
(h) Support the role of the justice system in society;  
(i) Promote governmental legitimacy and accountability;  
(j) Not unduly burden the ongoing business of the justice system; and  
(k) Make the most effective use of public resources allocated to public 
safety agencies.  
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The DIAC is a participant in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI). The shared space is a networked data and information 
repository, which is under the control of the submitting agencies and provides for the 
sharing of terrorism-related SAR information to participants in the NSI.  
Compliance with Law Regarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties  
All DIAC personnel, participating agency personnel, personnel providing 
information technology services to the DIAC, private contractors, and users will comply 
with this privacy policy and all applicable law protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties in the collection, use, analysis, retention, destruction, sharing and disclosure of 
information to DIAC personnel, governmental agencies (including ISE participating 
centers and agencies), and participating justice and public safety agencies, as well as to 
private contractors, private entities, and the general public.  
Accountability and Enforcement Information System Transparency  
(a) This policy establishing protections of privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties will be made available to the public on request and posted online at 
www.dsp.delaware.gov/.  
(b) The Director of the DIAC will be responsible for receiving and 
responding to inquiries and complaints about privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 
protections in the information system(s) maintained or accessed by the center (Delaware 
State Police, DIAC Privacy Policy, 2011, p. 3). 
f. Analysis 
Although not as large as the New Jersey Regional Operations Center, the 
Delaware Intelligence and Analysis Center performs its fusion center function serving 
many customers. Driven by a simple but effective mission statement focused on 
providing safety and security to the community, the DIAC ensures a collaborative 
environment incorporating such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Public 
Health, state and local law enforcement and Emergency Management. To ensure 
information exchange, the Delaware Intelligence and Analysis Center utilizes a myriad of 
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the internal databases, such as Memex, as well as external systems including the 
Homeland Security State & Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC)—an 
information sharing website for federal, state, local intelligence agencies, fusion centers, 
and the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS). In addition, the DIAC Privacy 
Policy serves the center as a guiding document to protect civil liberties and civil rights of 
the public, while providing the DIAC with a mechanism to determine how protected 
information is collected and secured. Although Privacy Policies are an important 
mechanisms to support Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, they are individual in nature and 
are not standard in language or design. Although there is similarity in core principles, 
they serve the purpose of the individual fusion centers much like the early development 
of fusion centers and may require standardization to be effective.   
3. The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC) 
a. Overview 
The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center was established to enhance 
law enforcement informational requirements. Today it continues to serve as an efficient 
mechanism to provide accurate and timely information.  
The Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Criminal Investigation, 
established the Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC) July of 
2003 in an effort to provide law enforcement agencies throughout the 
Commonwealth with one central point of contact for their information 
needs. Through the PaCIC, trained analysts provide state police members 
and federal, state, and municipal law enforcement officers with access to 
intelligence information, investigative data, and public source information 
24 hours a day, seven days per week. Analysts also provide investigative 
support by analyzing complex information and collating it into 
intelligence summaries, organization charts, link analysis, time event 
analysis, and other manageable, professional products. The PaCIC is an 
attempt to provide law enforcement officers a central point of contact for 
information needed during traffic stops, investigative detentions, and other 
law enforcement encounters and investigations.  
(Pennsylvania State Police, 2003, p. 1)  
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b. Mission Statement 
The mission of the PaCIC is to support the decision-making process of 
Pennsylvania’s law enforcement agencies through collating, analyzing, 
and disseminating intelligence and investigative information pertaining to 
criminal activity while ensuring the rights and privacy of citizens are not 
violated.  
(Pennsylvania State Police, 2011, p. 1) 
c. Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center is part of the Pennsylvania 
State Police and has created many partnerships at the federal, state, local levels of 
government, as well as the private sector through its Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resource (CI/KR) mission guided by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. By 
examining the designated 18 key critical sectors, the Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence 
Center increases community safety through an active CI/KR protection program.  
Recently the need was recognized to increase information sharing between 
criminal justice agencies and the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure and key resources throughout Pennsylvania with whom we 
share the fundamental responsibility of safeguarding our communities. 
Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources (CI/KR) are the assets, systems, 
and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the U.S. that their 
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, 
national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination 
thereof. A group of Intelligence Analysts at PaCIC are specifically tasked 
with monitoring potential threats to the various CI/KR sectors throughout 
Pennsylvania and keeping the owners and operators informed so they can 
better protect the Commonwealth’s infrastructure, environment, and 
citizens from future threats. 
(Pennsylvania State Police, 2010, p. 1). 
d. Staffing 
Staffing of the Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center includes 
members of the state and federal law enforcement community tasked with a mission of 
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crime and terrorism prevention. All hazard prevention outside of CI/KR protection is 
currently the responsibility of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 
(PEMA). 
e. Information Sharing 
In order to enhance security within Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania 
Criminal Intelligence Center produces and distributes the PACIC Daily Report focused 
on state and local crime trends and patterns, as well the Pennsylvania Criminal 
Intelligence Center’s Information Bulletins to assist critical infrastructure owners with 
current threat streams that could potentially impact various CI/KR sectors. 
f. Privacy Policy 
The purpose of the Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center’s Privacy 
Policy is to ensure the civil liberties and civil rights of citizens are not violated during any 
law enforcement action. The privacy policy ensures compliance with all federal, state and 
local laws pertaining to the collection, use and sharing of information. 
In addition, the privacy policy ensures transparency and accountability for 
all personnel engage in information sharing within the Pennsylvania Criminal 
Intelligence Center. The policy supports the information sharing environment (ISE), as 
well as the collection of information during Suspicious Activity Reporting. In addition, 
the Pennsylvania State Police have instituted privacy policy training, as well as 
establishing a Privacy Committee to address public concerns regarding privacy issues 
(Pennsylvania State Police, 2010, p. 1). 
g. Analysis 
The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center’s mission statement 
emphasizes and strong and clear message of support for the fusion process, while 
ensuring the protection of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the individual. This is 
further highlighted in the PaCIC Privacy Policy ensuring the civil rights of citizens are 
not violated as a result of law enforcement actions. Transparency and accountability are 
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key components of the PaCIC privacy policy echoing the sentiments of the American 
Civil Liberties Union described in Chapter I. A collaborative environment is maintained 
through the incorporation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well as analysis 
assigned to support the private sector through Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource 
protections.  
Similar to the Delaware Intelligence and Analysis Center, the 
Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center also utilizes similar data systems such as 
Memex, to share information both internally and externally with other fusion centers in 
an effort to streamline information and reduce costs. 
4. The Maryland Coordinating and Analysis Center (MCAC) 
a. Overview 
The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) was established 
under the guidance of the Maryland ATAC Executive Committee in 2003. The Anti-
Terrorism Advisory Committee consists of multiple agencies and disciplines including 
public health, law enforcement, transportation, fire and military personnel tasked with 
developing policies and procedures to support terrorism prevention in the state of 
Maryland. The MCAC is a 24 hour, 7 day a week operation focused on an all crimes and 
counterterrorism mission. 
b. Mission Statement 
The mission of the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center is “to 
provide analytical support for federal, state and local agencies involved in law 
enforcement, fire, emergency medical service, emergency response, public health and 
welfare, public safety and homeland security in Maryland ” (Maryland Coordination and 
Analysis Center, 2007, p. 1). The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center works 
closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). 
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c. Staffing 
The MCAC staffing consists of federal, state and local government 
partners tasked with the prevention of crime and terrorism within the state of Maryland, 
including the Department of Homeland Security, ATF, DEA, ICE, and the FBI. In 
addition, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center supports three regional centers 
in Southern Maryland, Eastern Shore, and Western Maryland (Maryland Coordination 
and Analysis Center, 2007, p. 1). 
d. Watch Section 
The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Watch Center serves as the core 
center for warnings and alerts. The Watch, receives tips and leads, and identifies 
suspicious activities. The Watch Section’s core functions include: 
 Receive and process suspicious activity Tips. 
 Receive and process requests for information (RFI) and requests for 
Service (RFS). 
 Monitor all available intelligence sources. 
 Coordinate Maryland law enforcement resources. 
 Disseminate and Communicate intelligence information. 
Primary Watch Section Databases: 
 Case Explorer (Nonterrorism TIPS tracking and intelligence database). 
 SONAR—MCAC tracking database. 
 Guardian—FBI terrorism tracking database. 
 Automated Case System (ACS). 
 Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (Maryland Coordination and 
Analysis Center, 2007, p. 8). 
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In addition to enhance information dissemination, the Maryland 
Coordination and Analysis Center also utilizes federal HSIN, LEO and RISS information 
sharing systems. These systems support information collaboration across the intelligence 
community. 
e. Information Sharing 
The MCAC supports information sharing at the federal, state and local 
levels of government including the Maryland Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 
Terrorist Screening Centers (TSC), the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), the 
National Operations Center (NOC), Washington/Baltimore High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area (HITA) to name a few.  
f. Privacy 
The MCAC privacy policy ensures that all agencies, employees and users 
comply with all applicable laws and regulations protecting individual and organizations 
privacy rights, and civil liberties in the use, analysis, retention, destruction, sharing and 
disclosure of protected information.  
g. Analysis  
The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center’s Strategic Analysis 
Section identifies patterns or trends, is preventative in nature, assesses threats, produces 
bulletins, alerts and warnings as well as strategic assessments. The mission of the (SAS) 
is to “to provide strategic analysis to better focus the investigative activities being 
conducted by law enforcement agencies within the state and to better enable public health 
and safety agencies to perform their important protective functions” (Maryland 
Coordination and Analysis Center, 2007, p. 10). 
The Maryland Coordinating and Analysis Center, is uniquely housed in 
federal space overseen by the U.S. Attorney’s Advisory Council, which appears to 
provide direct connectivity with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task 
Force, as well as other federal agencies, such as the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), the 
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FBI Counter Terror Watch, and the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC). The 
MCAC is a collaborative environment consisting of many federal, state and local law 
enforcement agencies, including the FBI, Maryland State Police and Baltimore City 
Police Department.  
The Maryland Coordinating and Analysis and Coordinating Center utilizes 
a  number of federal, state and local databases, including Interpol, Leo, HISN and RISS. 
In addition, the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center supports three regional 
centers in Southern Maryland, Eastern Shore and Western Maryland. The MCAC’s 
mission statement emphasizes analytical support to both traditional law enforcement and 
nonlaw enforcement agencies such as fire, public health and welfare and emergency 
response ensuring collaboration across a broad spectrum of emergency responders. 
Although, it is not possible at this time to integrate every fusion center into federal space, 
the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center appears to be a model of federal, state 
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V. ANALYSIS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
Chapter V provides a summary analysis of the current state of fusion centers. 
While a formalized Fusion Center Doctrine may not be the appropriate solution to 
support fusion center maturation, it describes how guidance is being effectively applied 
by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security to enhance 
fusion center development, including institution of the four identified critical operating 
capabilities. Chapter V concludes with identifying the core competencies necessary to 
build a model fusion center, as well as areas for future consideration and research. 
In order to enhance multidiscipline information sharing at the federal, state and 
local levels of government, the United States Department of Homeland Security has 
identified state and local/regional fusion centers as primary points of collection, analysis, 
and distribution of real-time threat information over the Fusion Center Network. There 
are currently 72 fusion centers throughout the United States operating at different levels 
of capability. These centers created in 2004 and 2005 were initially developed with little 
guidelines or formalized structure. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. 
Department of Justice have since produced many documents to serve as templates or 
guidelines to support fusion center’s development and to support a cohesive fusion center 
network.  
No two fusion centers are alike, there is no formalized uniformity, although this 
research has shown that fusion centers contain core principles identified in the Fusion 
Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities, their missions are unique to the environment 
and their area of responsibility. Owned and operated by state and local governments, 
these centers are an extension of those individual states and local government’s 
prevention strategies. Although this research has exhibited an unequivocal requirement 





Sector entities to support crime and terrorism prevention, it has also demonstrated that the 
protection of civil rights and civil liberties are paramount as fusion centers move forward 
in their quest to prevent crime and terrorism.  
Although the possibility of developing a formal fusion center doctrine, one that 
would enable all fusion centers to function consistently, was considered, formal doctrines 
are often rigid and leave little room for the necessary flexibility that is required to support 
individual state and local missions. In addition, a federal formal doctrine that is directive 
in nature may be seen as intrusive and may not take into account state and local 
requirements. “Given that fusion centers are entities established by states, localities and 
regions to serve their own criminal, emergency response, and terrorism prevention needs, 
and the sensitivities associated with federalism, there may not necessarily be a federal 
remedy to every fusion center-related issue” (Rollins, 2007, p. 56). 
A review of the U.S Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of 
Justice Fusion Center Guidelines, Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities, Privacy and Civil 
Liberties and Civil Rights Protections, as well as the Critical Operational Capabilities 
during this research, conclude that these documents are both accepted by the fusion 
center community and are very capable of serving as templates for nonrestrictive 
guidance. They would provide the fusion centers with the necessary direction to be 
effective, while affording individual fusion centers the ability to establish their unique 
priorities based on their area of responsibilities.  
In addition, these documents provide a comprehensive roadmap for success, and 
with the continual support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, these efforts 
have proven to be both effective and efficient. Further support for the implementation of 
fusion center guidelines was offered by several law enforcement agencies that are the 
core of Fusion Center Operations. “The Federal Fusion Center Guidelines (FCG) 
received support from several law enforcement organizations, including the Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) and Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), 
which added further credibility to the fusion center movement”(Rollins, 2006, p. 40). 
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A review of the 2010 Baseline Capabilities assessment of Fusion Centers and 
Critical Operational Capabilities Gap Mitigation Strategy revealed that these guidelines 
are proven effective and promising in reaching stability and cohesiveness among the 
Fusion Center Community.  
In September 2010, federal, state, and local officials completed the first 
nationwide, in depth assessment of fusion centers to evaluate fusion center capabilities 
and to establish strategic priorities for federal government support. The 2010 Baseline 
Capabilities Assessment (BCA) was conducted by the Office of the Program Manager for 
the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), in coordination with Fusion Center 
Directors, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and other federal interagency partners.  
The objectives of the BCA were to; Assess fusion centers’ capabilities in an effort 
to understand the overall maturity of the National Network of Fusion Centers; Leverage 
the data gathered to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of federal support of fusion 
centers’ efforts to achieve and maintain baseline capabilities through investment planning 
and prioritized resource allocation; Establish strategic priorities and help identify gaps in 
capabilities at individual fusion centers and across the National Network; and aid fusion 
centers in reaching their full potential to serve as focal points within the state, local, 
tribal, and territorial (SLTT) environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing 
of threat-related information. 
The 2010 BCA on-site validation focused primarily on the four Critical 
Operational Capabilities (COCs), which reflected the National Network priorities 
identified jointly by Fusion Center Directors and the federal government during the 2010 
National Fusion Center Conference: 
 COC 1—Receive: Ability to receive classified and unclassified 
information from federal partners; 
 COC 2—Analyze: Ability to assess local implications of threat 
information through the use of a formal risk assessment process; 
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 COC 3—Disseminate: Ability to further disseminate threat information to 
other SLTT and private sector entities within their jurisdiction; and 
 COC 4—Gather: Ability to gather locally generated information, 
aggregate it, analyze it, and share it with federal partners, as appropriate. 
Beginning in January 2011, DHS launched an effort to evaluate both the results of 
the short-term COC gap mitigation efforts, and the effectiveness of federal resources 
provided to assist fusion centers in building their capabilities in the COCs and P/CRCL 
protections. Based on the results of this evaluation, fusion centers made progress from 
September 2010 to December 2010 in building their capabilities and addressing gaps 
identified during the BCA. Fusion centers reported significant progress in defining their 
business processes through the development of final, approved plans, policies, and/or 
standard operating procedures for each of the four COCs. The greatest increase in 
capabilities during the short-term COC gap mitigation efforts were related to COC 2: 
Analyze, and P/CRCL protections. Fusion centers overwhelmingly responded that they 
were provided a clear understanding of the intent and expected timeframe associated with 
the Short-Term Strategy, and that they were provided with adequate guidance to meet the 
short-term gap mitigation objectives” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010 
Baseline Capabilities assessment of fusion centers, 2010, p. 1).  
Employing a formative evaluation methodology provided a unique perspective 
based on-site observations in four fusion centers located in the Northeastern United 
States. These four centers in New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Maryland were 
chosen due to their geographical locations. In addition, the information acquired during 
this process will be utilized by my agency, the Philadelphia Police Department, to 
support the development of a future fusion center located in the Delaware Valley Region, 
whose mission will be to support the above-mentioned four state fusion centers from a 
regional area of operations.  
The purpose was to improve the program by identifying strengths and weaknesses 
of existing fusion centers, identify the importance or lack of importance of  
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standardization, identify means of effective information sharing and collaboration to 
enhance the fusion center network and to identify or create synthesis in discovering the 
required steps or actions to build a model fusion center.  
By employing the Program Evaluation Method, it was possible to identify and 
capture real-world nuisances during on-site observations that would not have been 
possible utilizing alternative research methods such as a survey methodology. In addition, 
the employment of a Force Field Analysis provided a mechanism to identify the driving 
forces that are positive for the development of a model fusion center and areas that inhibit 
fusion center effectiveness. 
 
Figure 6.   Force Field Analysis 
 
Positive Forces (Driving Forces) identified during this analysis of the four chosen 
fusion centers revealed the following:  
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Strong Leadership appears to be a key component in the development of effective 
model fusion center. First identified in the Fusion Center Guidelines as a core principle. 
In developing our country’s response to the threat of terrorism, law enforcement, public 
safety, and private sector, leaders have recognized the need to improve the sharing of 
information and intelligence across agency borders. Every official involved in 
information and intelligence sharing has a stake in this initiative. Leaders must move 
forward with a new paradigm on the exchange of information and intelligence; one that 
includes the integration of law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector (U.S. 
Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, p. iii). The 
importance of leadership was further collaborated during onsite fusion center visits, as 
well as being identified as a recognized criteria in award winning fusion centers. This 
quality further epitomizes the importance of leadership to ensure compliance, 
accountability and transparency in fusion center operations. 
Developing a clear and concise Mission Statement. 
A mission statement is a written statement of the organization’s purpose, 
such as enhancing public safety, sharing information, or resolving criminal 
investigations. It is important to have a mission statement because it 
focuses efforts and is the foundation of all the decisions that follow. A 
mission statement can also inspire people in the organization and inform 
customers of the benefits and advantages of what the organization offers 
and is the first step in educating entities about the center and its services.  
(U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2006, p. 23)  
Building a model fusion center begins with establishing focus. The analysis of all four 
fusion centers indicated that their mission statement provided clear direction for current 
and future development. 
Institution of a formal privacy policy to ensure protection of Civil Liberties and 
Civil Rights protections. Protecting Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is paramount within 
the development of a model fusion center.  
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) stresses the 
need to ensure that constitutional rights, civil liberties, civil rights, and 
 81
privacy are protected throughout the intelligence process. In order to 
balance law enforcement’s ability to share information with the rights of 
citizens, appropriate privacy and civil liberties policies must be in place. 
(U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2006, p. 41) 
Establishing a collaborative environment for sharing of information—
collaborative environments support information sharing across a wide spectrum of first 
responders. Collaboration was a key element observed in the four fusion centers visited 
during this analysis. Described as a collaborative justification under Fusion Center 
Guideline # 4, collaboration is a means used to: 
To maximize intelligence sharing, all levels of law enforcement and public 
safety agencies and the private sector must communicate and collaborate. 
The objective is to leverage resources and expertise while improving the 
ability to detect, prevent, and apprehend terrorists and other criminals.  
Fostering a collaborative environment builds trust among participating 
entities, strengthens partnerships, and provides _individual as well as a 
collective ownership in the mission and goals of the center. 
(U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2006, p. 29) 
Leverage the databases, systems, and networks. Leveraging existing 
databases reduces cost and provides immediate communication. “Centers 
may want to evaluate the types of databases that participating agencies 
have available. Gaps should be identified and researched. Leveraging the 
databases and systems available via participating entities will help 
maximize information sharing.  
(U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2006, 
p. 33)   
Fusion centers utilizing comparative databases will streamline information 
exchange, reduce costs and support fusion center operations. Building a model fusion  
 
center will require a general and specific understanding of the various databases at the 
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federal state and local levels to exchange information. Identifying correlating databases 
will support technological collaboration  
Although, further study could identify additional similarities, these five positive 
driving forces were identified as key themes consistent with each fusion center during 
this research. In addition, these themes are consistent with the recommended Fusion 
Center Guidelines for developing and sharing information and intelligence in a new era.  
Negative Forces (Restraining Forces) identified during this analysis of the four 
chosen fusion centers revealed the following:  
No two fusion centers are alike, and there is no formalized uniformity. Although 
this research has shown fusion centers contain core principles identified in the Fusion 
Center Guidelines and Baseline Capabilities, their missions are unique to the 
environment, and their area of responsibility, as well as to the states and local 
governments they serve. 
Although, Privacy Policies are important mechanisms to support Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties, they are individual in nature and are not standard in language or design. 
Although,, there is similarity in core principles, they serve the purpose of the individual 
fusion centers, much like the lack of standardization first observed in the development of 
early of fusion centers and may require standardization to be effective.   
Utilizing existing databases, as well as federal systems such as HSIN and Leo, 
provide fusion centers with the capability to exchange information across a broad 
spectrum of partnerships. However, a multitude of disparate databases may impinge upon 
information sharing at the federal state and local levels. In developing a model fusion 
center, it is necessary to weave through competing databases and support development of 
database interoperability.   
No defined Performance Measure to indicate Fusion Center Value. Although this 
research has reviewed many documents and conducted onsite observations, there are 
currently no formalized performance measures or matrix to ensure fusion center 
performance. As budgets are cut across the spectrum of federal programs, fusion centers 
will be required to exhibit value added to the Intelligence Community. Although, success 
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stories are important, developing a model fusion center will require a more formalized 
mechanism or structure to ensure success.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Fusion centers across the country will continue to serve as a key component in the 
intelligence community. The recent terrorist attack in Times Square, New York have 
proven that an alert public, supported by a well-informed and coordinated law 
enforcement agency serving in a multijurisdictional environment, can prevent terrorist 
activity. Although, fusion centers serve as portals for collaboration, their true value lies in 
the relationships they create and the willingness of individuals to cross federal, state, 
local and tribal boundaries to keep communities safe. In addition, this research has shown 
that protecting privacy of individuals must remain constant in all fusion center 
applications. Although there is a myriad of suggestions or guidelines to support the 
development of a model fusion center, core components, such as a strong Mission 
Statement to establish direction of effort and leveraging existing databases that are 
comparative with other fusion center’s databases, are effective strategies to reduce costs 
and support integration efforts.  
It is also critical in today’s economy to ensure proper staffing, continual funding, 
as well as promoting fusion center’s awareness as key components to address crime and 
terrorism and identifying the path forward in creating a network of fusion centers of 
excellence. Although short-term gap mitigation proved successful, the true value of 
fusion centers is operating as a united force. One way to ensure future success of fusion 
centers is to develop Performance Measures to indicate fusion center value.  
To enhance the ability to demonstrate the results fusion centers are 
achieving in support of national information sharing goals and help 
prioritize how future resources should be allocated, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security should direct the State and Local Program Office, in 
partnership with fusion center officials, to define the steps it will take to 
design and implement a set of standard performance measures to show the  
 
 
results and value centers are adding to the Information Sharing 
Environment and commit to a target timeframe for completing them. 
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(GAO-10-972, 2010, p. 1) 
In addition, fusion centers must be predictive in nature avoiding the Black Swan 
event, one that is highly improbable, with a devastating impact that we should have seen 
coming. By utilizing a risk based analysis, fusion centers will begin to better forecast 
merging threats, improve performance and enhance prevention. Utilizing business 
models, such as the “Cynefin Framework,” Fusion centers can institute predictive 
analysis, better forecast potential problems, learn to survive, or at least exist in various 
complex, complicated, chaotic and simple environments (Snowden, 2003, p. 1). 
B. CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of September, 11, 2001, it became clearly evident that the United 
States faced a new and dynamic enemy, one that valued imagination as a strategic 
advantage. This new enemy with external support adapted to operate internally within 
America. Failure of imagination (9/11 Commission) is the process of failing to recognize 
the recognizable. Today’s enemy seeks new opportunities and places the American public 
at risk. Failure to share information across the wide spectrum of intelligence agencies at 
the federal, state, tribal and local levels of government may result in another high impact 
event.  
Fusion Centers are in a unique position to provide the necessary collaborative 
space to bring the federal intelligence community together with state, local and tribal 
initiatives to support Homeland Security efforts at the grass roots level. 
Proficiency and perfection are critical components in today’s fusion center 
environment. Tasked with the ability to share information and create collaboration 
between federal, state, local and tribal partners, while managing an all crimes and all 
hazards perspective, in addition to preventing terrorism, will require a finely honed 
instrument. On March 11, 2009, United States Department of Homeland Security 
Secretary Napolitano related in her remarks to the National Fusion Center conference in 
Kansas City, Missouri, “I believe that fusion centers will be the centerpiece of state, 
local, federal intelligence-sharing for the future and that the Department of Homeland 
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Security will be working and aiming its programs to underlie fusion centers” (Napolitano, 
2009). 
Today, there are currently 72 fusion centers throughout the county comprised of 
50 state and 22 local or regional centers. These centers created in 2004 and 2005 were 
initially developed with few guidelines or formalized structures, which limited their 
ability to effectively communicate or share information with other federal, state and local 
partners. However, an analysis of the four fusion centers conducted during this research 
indicates a positive change, as these centers appear to be steadily moving in a direction of 
cohesiveness and uniformity based on the guidance provided by existing documents and 
the support of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of 
Justice. 
In addition, this research has concluded that building a model fusion center will 
require adoption of identified core competencies including; Strong leadership, clear 
mission statements, goals and objectives, development of a formal privacy policy to 
ensure civil liberties and civil rights based on lawfulness and constitutional protections, 
standard operating procedures, consistent training, creation of a collaborative 
environment, adherence with the National Criminal Intelligence plan, governance, and 
common analytical tools, as well as ensuring products that meet customers requirements. 
Although the possibility of developing a formal fusion center doctrine, one that 
would enable all fusion centers to function consistently, was considered, formal doctrines 
are often rigid and leave little room for the necessary flexibility that is required to support 
individual state and local missions. In addition, a federal formal doctrine that is directive 
in nature may be seen as intrusive and may not take into account state and local 
requirements. “Given that fusion centers are entities established by states, localities and 
regions to serve their own criminal, emergency response, and terrorism prevention needs, 
and the sensitivities associated with federalism, there may not necessarily be a federal 
remedy to every fusion center-related issue” (Rollins, 2007, p. 56). 
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In addition, although the development of core competencies ensures success of 
fusion centers, operational relevance will only be achieved through the development of 
fusion center’s Performance Measures.  
To enhance the ability to demonstrate the results fusion centers are 
achieving in support of national information sharing goals and help 
prioritize how future resources should be allocated, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security should direct the State and Local Program Office, in 
partnership with fusion center officials, to define the steps it will take to 
design and implement a set of standard performance measures to show the 
results and value centers are adding to the Information Sharing 
Environment and commit to a target timeframe for completing them. 
(GAO-10-972, 2010, p. 1)   
Turning information into actionable intelligence is the corner stone of fusion 
center operations; failure to connect the dots described in the 9/11 Commission report led 
to the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. There are currently numerous 
databases at the federal, state and local levels of government that limit federate search 
capability. Although, there are improvements on the horizon, this appears to be more of a 
need for a cultural change than a need for a technology required solution.  
Lastly, there are many positive initiatives that will support future fusion center 
operations that may require further research to ensure success. One area that appears 
promising is the unwavering support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and their 
commitment, under the Deputy Assistant Director Harris, to provide analytical support 
from their field/regional intelligence group into enhance federal, state, tribal and local 
information sharing effectiveness on a state and regional level.  
Another area for consideration is an inspiring commitment from the Major Cities 
Chief’s Association to approve the establishment of a “National Criminal Intelligence 
Enterprise (NICE).”   
The objective is to establish the necessary architecture to better connect 





regional threat domains, compliment the capabilities of the FBI and DHS, 
and fulfill the objective of state and local law enforcement to prevent 
crime and terrorism. 
(Major Cities Chief’s Intelligence Commanders Group, 2011, p. 1)  
This idea is further collaborated in a study conducted by George Washington 
University, Homeland Security Policy Institute entitled “Counterterrorism Intelligence: 
Law Enforcement Perspectives.” In this study, it is suggested that law enforcement is 
both the first and last line in detecting threats of terrorism within our communities, 
however, the ability of American officials to support those law enforcement officers on 
the front line is an open question as the United States lacks understanding of the 
intelligence enterprise, which results in a limited ability to develop anticipatory 
knowledge regarding future attacks (Cilluffo, Clark, Downing 2011, p. 1). Both of these 
initiatives support the fusion center environment and appear to open new possibilities for 
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